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Four Problems with the Draft Restatement’s
Treatment of Treaty Self-Execution
Carlos Manuel Vázquez*
The American Law Institute has embarked on the challenging
task of restating the confounding distinction between self-executing
and non-self-executing treaties. In some respects, the current draft
represents an advance from the treatment of the subject in the
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States. At
the same time, the current draft retains, and may even aggravate,
some of the flaws of that earlier treatment. Such retrogression might
be explained by the fact that the new project has to deal with a
recent, puzzling Supreme Court decision on the subject. At the time
of the Restatement (Third), the Court had not addressed this
distinction in any depth since its original decisions introducing the
doctrine almost two centuries earlier, namely Foster v. Neilson 1 and
United States v. Percheman. 2 The Court’s 2008 decision in Medellín
v. Texas, 3 the first since Foster to deny relief on the ground that the
treaty being invoked was non-self-executing, 4 presents obvious
challenges to any attempt to restate the law on this subject. The
reporters are largely successful at avoiding the blind alleys down
which Medellín might have led them. They rightly recognize that
some of the views expressed in the opinion are untenable and
conclude that “[t]he unusual circumstances of Medellín . . . counsels
against generalizing too much from the Court’s finding there of
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I am grateful to the organizers of and
participants in the B.Y.U Treaty Symposium and to the editors of the law review.
1. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 256 (1829).
2. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 89 (1833).
3. 552 U.S. 491, 510–13, 523 (2008).
4. Cameron Septic Tank Co. v. Knoxville, 227 U.S. 39, 50 (1913), is a possible
exception. See Medellín, 552 U.S. at 545 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Carlos Manuel
Vázquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM J. INT’L L. 695, 716 (1995)
[hereinafter Four Doctrines]). But cf. Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Treaties as Law of the Land: The
Supremacy Clause and the Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, 122 HARV. L. REV. 599, 601 n.8
(2008) [hereinafter Judicial Enforcement] (questioning whether Cameron Septic Tank really
rested on the Court’s conclusion that the relevant treaty was non-self-executing).
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non-self-execution.” 5 On some issues, however, the reporters
overlook this wise counsel. On others, the problems with the draft
are not traceable to Medellín.
This Essay suggests four ways the current draft could be
improved. First, the draft should explicitly recognize that the
concept of self-execution is not a unitary one. The draft already
implicitly recognizes this by distinguishing three of the issues that
courts and commentators have analyzed under the “selfexecution” label. 6 Explicit recognition of the non-unitary nature
of self-execution doctrine would significantly advance clarity of
analysis. The draft should also recognize a fourth distinct version
of self-execution.
Second, the draft should abandon the claim that the selfexecuting or non-self-executing nature of a treaty is “essentially”
about the treaty’s judicial enforceability. Only one of the four types
of non-self-execution might be said to be essentially about judicial
enforceability. With respect to the others, lack of judicial
enforceability is just one of the consequences of a treaty’s non-selfexecuting character. The non-self-executing character of a treaty has
important ramifications for state and federal executive officials and
ordinary citizens as well as the judiciary. More importantly, the claim
that self-execution is essentially about judicial enforceability can
potentially distort the analysis of when a treaty is properly
characterized as non-self-executing. The draft’s focus on judicial
enforceability is perhaps a reflection of the fact that “[r]estatements
are primarily addressed to courts.” 7 But it should be kept in mind
that, for all but one of the categories of self-execution, a treaty’s
unenforceability in court is a consequence of its non-self-executing
character—one of a number of possible consequences—rather than
its cause.
Third, the draft should qualify its claim that self-execution
turns on the intent of the U.S. treaty makers. This claim

5. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES: TREATIES § 106 reporters’ note 3 (AM. LAW INST., April Discussion Draft 2015).
6. This is the main respect in which it represents an advance from the
Restatement (Third).
7. AM. LAW INST., CAPTURING THE VOICE OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE: A
HANDBOOK FOR ALI REPORTERS AND THOSE WHO REVIEW THEIR WORK 3 (1st ed., rev.
2015), https://www.ali.org/doc/StyleManual.pdf.
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perpetuates a mistake in the Restatement (Third). The current
version abandons the flawed logic that led to the Restatement
(Third)’s mistaken conclusion, but it defends the mistaken
conclusion on other grounds. In reality, only one of the categories
of self-execution might be said to turn on intent at all. With respect
to this category of non-self-execution, as originally explained in
Foster and Percheman, the relevant intent is not that of the U.S.
treatymakers, but that of the parties to the treaty. Evidence of the
intent of the U.S. treatymakers is relevant in ascertaining the intent
of the parties, and may be entitled to special deference by U.S.
courts, but it is not conclusive.
In support of the claim that self-execution turns on the intent of
the U.S. treatymakers, the reporters rely on the Medellín opinion
and on the recent practice of attaching declarations of non-selfexecution to some treaties. Medellín, however, does not support the
draft’s claim. The practice of attaching declarations of non-selfexecution supports the claim, but only in part. Although the validity
of such declarations is disputed, the reporters’ conclusion that the
declarations are valid and effective is sound. The validity of such
declarations, however, only supports the conclusion that the intent
of the U.S. treatymakers determines the issue of self-execution when
the treatymakers have expressed their intent in such a declaration. It
does not support the draft’s broader claim that the self-execution
issue turns on the intent of the U.S. treatymakers in the absence of
such a declaration. The latter conclusion is not only lacking in
judicial or other support, it also raises substantial constitutional
problems not acknowledged or addressed in the current draft.
Fourth, and finally, the draft should modify its claim that there
is no presumption either in favor or against self-execution. There is
substantial support in case law for a presumption in favor of selfexecution with respect to one of the categories of self-execution—
the “intent-based” category. Because treaties generally do not
address the issue raised by the self-execution doctrine (a
proposition recognized by the reporters), a default rule is necessary
and will wind up determining the self-executing or non-selfexecuting character of most treaties. The two available default rules
are self-execution and non-self-execution. There is language in
Medellín that might be read to support a default rule of non-selfexecution, but there is also language in Medellín that points the
other way. A default rule of non-self-execution is difficult to square
1749
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with the text of the Supremacy Clause, and the current draft rightly
rejects it. A presumption of self-execution, on the other hand, is
supported by the constitutional text, by Chief Justice Marshall’s
analysis in Percheman, and by the sheer number of cases in which
the Supreme Court has either found treaties to be self-executing or
enforced treaties without pausing to inquire about their selfexecuting character.
I. THE NON-UNITARY NATURE OF THE SELF-EXECUTION
QUESTION
In previous work, I have identified four distinct categories of
non-self-executing treaties—that is, four types of reasons why a
treaty might be non-self-executing. 8 First, a treaty might be non-selfexecuting because it purports to accomplish something that, under
our Constitution, may only be done by the lawmakers. For example,
it is widely agreed that the criminalization of conduct can only be
accomplished by statute. 9 This is the “constitutionality” category.
Second, a treaty might be non-self-executing because the obligation
it imposes is too vague for judicial enforcement or otherwise requires
policy judgments of a nonjudicial nature. This category includes
treaties that require parties to use their best efforts to accomplish
certain goals10 or broadly require that parties, for example,
“promot[e] and encourag[e] respect for human rights[.]” 11 This is
the “justiciability” category. 12 Third, a treaty might be non-selfexecuting because the treaty itself contemplates that its aims will be
accomplished through the enactment of legislation. This is the
“intent-based” category. 13 Fourth, a treaty might be non-self-

8. See generally Four Doctrines, supra note 4; Judicial Enforcement, supra note 4,
at 629–31.
9. See Four Doctrines, supra note 4, at 718–19 & n.108. Accord RESTATEMENT
(FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES: TREATIES § 106
reporters’ note 5 (AM. LAW INST., April Discussion Draft 2015).
10. See Judicial Enforcement, supra note 4, at 631.
11. See U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 3 (found to be non-self-executing in Sei Fujii v. State,
242 P.2d 617, 619 n.2, 630 (Cal. 1952)).
12. See Four Doctrines, supra note 4, at 710–18.
13. Id. at 700–10. For the reasons discussed infra note 87, a better name would be
treaty-based non-self-execution.
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executing because it does not create a private right of action. This is
the “private right of action” category. 14
The draft Restatement (Fourth) implicitly recognizes at least two
distinct categories of non-self-execution, the intent-based category
and the constitutionality category. It also recognizes the distinctness
of the private right of action issue, albeit by insisting that this issue is
not really a self-execution issue. 15 The draft’s recognition that selfexecution is not a unitary concept is an important advance from the
earlier Restatement (Third). Unfortunately, the draft does not make
this point explicitly. It should do so. 16 It should also recognize the
“justiciability” category as distinct from the others.
A. The Distinctness of the Constitutionality and Intent-Based
Categories
The structure of Section 106 of the draft Restatement (Fourth)
supports the common-sense view that treaties that are non-selfexecuting because they purport to accomplish what, under our
Constitution, may only be accomplished by statute fall into a
completely distinct category than treaties that are non-self-executing
because they were intended to be. In the third subsection of Section
106, the black letter provides that “a treaty provision [is] non-selfexecuting to the extent that implementing legislation is

14. Id. at 719–22.
15. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES: TREATIES § 106 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST., April Discussion Draft 2015).
16. In his contribution to this symposium, Professor Sloss distinguishes three
“concepts” of self-execution—the congressional-executive concept, the federal-state concept,
and the political judicial concept. See David Sloss, Taming Madison’s Monster: How to Fix SelfExecution Doctrine, 2015 BYU L. REV. 1691 (2016). These concepts differ from the ones
identified here in that they refer to different effects of a conclusion that a treaty is self-executing
or non-self-executing. Thus, a treaty that is not self-executing in the “federal-state” sense does
not supersede state law, see id. at text accompanying note 26; a treaty that is non-self-executing
in the “political-judicial” sense is not enforceable in the courts, see id. at text accompanying
note 27; and a treaty that is non-self-executing in the “congressional-executive” sense “is not
law for the executive branch unless it is implemented by Congress,” see id. at 1691. The
categories identified in this Essay refer to the causes of non-self-execution. That is, they refer to
distinct types of reasons why a treaty might be non-self-executing. As discussed below, the
effects of a non-self-executing treaty will vary depending on the reasons for concluding that
the treaty is non-self-executing.
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constitutionally required.” 17 In the immediately preceding
subsection, the draft provides that “[i]n determining whether a
treaty provision is self-executing, courts will evaluate whether, in
light of the provision’s terms and the treaty as a whole, the U.S.
treatymakers intended or understood the provision to be directly
enforceable by the judiciary.” 18 Although the draft does not state in
so many words that these are separate and distinct categories of nonself-executing treaties, that conclusion is inescapable under the
draft’s own analysis.
It is clear that the non-self-executing character of the treaties
addressed by Section 106(3) does not turn on the intent of the U.S.
treatymakers regarding the treaty’s direct judicial enforceability.
Their non-self-executing character is a result of the fact that what
they purport to accomplish is beyond the constitutional power of the
treatymakers to accomplish. A statute is required because the treaty
purports to accomplish what, under the Constitution, may only be
done by statute. Such a treaty would be non-self-executing even if
the U.S. treatymakers unambiguously intended to dispense with
implementing legislation. Thus, if it is true that the Constitution
does not empower the treatymakers to create criminal liability under
domestic law, as the draft Restatement (Fourth) suggests, 19 then a
treaty purporting to create criminal liability under domestic law will
be non-self-executing even if the U.S. treatymakers clearly express
their intent or understanding that the treaty is directly judicially
enforceable. The draft implicitly recognizes this in Comment g when
it asserts that “[w]hether congressional powers are exclusive in this
sense is determined by constitutional text, structure, and
practice[,]” 20 without mentioning the intent of the treatymakers.
The draft should take the obvious next step of explicitly recognizing
that the constitutionality category of non-self-execution is distinct
from the intent-based category. 21

17. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES: TREATIES § 106(3) (AM. LAW INST., April Discussion Draft 2015).
18. Id. § 106(2).
19. Id. § 106 reporters’ note 5.
20. Id. § 106 cmt. g.
21. As discussed in Part III, the draft’s claim that non-self-execution turns on the
unilateral intent of the U.S. treatymakers is true only for a limited class of treaties—those to
which the treatymakers have attached a declaration concerning the self-execution question,
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The “constitutionality” category of non-self-executing treaties is
also distinct from the “intent based” category with respect to other
broad claims about the concept of non-self-execution advanced in
the current draft. For example, the draft rejects Medellín’s attempt to
explain the basic nature of the concept of non-self-execution insofar
as “the Court suggested that a non-self-executing treaty was not
domestic law at all.” 22 The reporters maintain instead that the selfexecution concept is “essentially” about a treaty’s judicial

perhaps only those to which the treatymakers have attached a declaration of non-selfexecution. See infra Part III. As for other treaties, both Foster and Medellín support the
conclusion that self-execution turns on the meaning of the treaty itself, which is based on the
intent of the parties to the treaty. In any event, a treaty that purports to accomplish what under
the Constitution may only be accomplished by statute is non-self-executing even if the parties
to the treaty intended to dispense with implementing legislation. Indeed, it is the
unconstitutionality of what the treaty parties intended to accomplish that renders the treaty
non-self-executing. The treaty, in other words, is non-self-executing despite the parties’
contrary intention.
22. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES: TREATIES § 106 reporters’ note 6 (AM. LAW INST., April Discussion Draft 2015). The
draft claims that Medellín is ambiguous on this point because the opinion sometimes refers to
the fact that a non-self-executing treaty relates to its status as domestic law enforceable in the
courts. See Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 519, 523 (2008) (quoted in RESTATEMENT
(FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES: TREATIES § 106
reporters’ note 6 (AM. LAW INST., April Discussion Draft 2015)). But the draft understates the
significance of the footnote in which the Court directly addresses the question of what it
means by non-self-execution:
The label “self-executing” has on occasion been used to convey different meanings.
What we mean by “self-executing” is that the treaty has automatic domestic effect as
federal law upon ratification. Conversely, a “non-self-executing” treaty does not by
itself give rise to domestically enforceable federal law. Whether such a treaty has
domestic effect depends upon implementing legislation passed by Congress.
Medellín, 552 U.S. at 505 n.2. The third sentence of the footnote states that a non-selfexecuting treaty is not “domestically enforceable federal law,” rather than that it lacks the force
of domestic law at all. Even this formulation suggests that such a treaty is not enforceable by
executive as well as by judicial officials. The second and fourth sentences suggest that such a
treaty lacks the force of domestic law at all, as do all but a few of the Court’s statements in the
opinion that shed light on its views on this question, including the two statements that the
draft itself cites as support for the proposition that the Court understood the self-execution
issue to turn on the intent of the U.S. treatymakers. See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES: TREATIES § 106 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST.,
April Discussion Draft 2015) (quoting two statements in Medellín, 552 U.S. at 519, 521, both
of which refer to the intent of the President and the Senate regarding whether the treaty has
“domestic effect”). See also Medellín, 552 U.S. at 527 (describing a non-self-executing treaty as
one that was “ratified without provisions clearly according it domestic effect[]”); id. at 527
(“A non-self-executing treaty, by definition, is one that was ratified with the understanding
that it is not to have domestic effect of its own force.”).
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enforceability (or lack thereof). With respect to the intent-based
category of non-self-execution, the draft is right to reject the
understanding of the concept expressed in Medellín. Such a view is
incompatible with the plain text of the Supremacy Clause, which
declares “all” U.S. treaties to be supreme federal law. But the
Medellín understanding is true with respect to treaties that are nonself-executing in the constitutional sense. The non-self-executing
character of such treaties is not just a matter of judicial enforceability.
Treaties that are non-self-executing because what they purport to
accomplish is beyond the power of the treatymakers are not
“domestically enforceable” by courts or by executive law-applying
officials. Such treaties are unconstitutional and thus do, indeed, lack
the force of domestic law. 23 The fact that such treaties differ from
other non-self-executing treaties because they lack the force of
domestic law is another reason to make clear that the
constitutionality category is separate and distinct from the intentbased category.
The current draft appears to recognize that the constitutional
category of non-self-execution is separate and distinct from the
intent-based category. It devotes a separate subsection of the
black letter, a separate comment, and a separate reporters’ note to
treaties that purport to do what may only be done by statute.
Indeed, Comment d, which addresses the importance of the
intent of the U.S. treatymakers, appears to recognize that treaties
that are constitutionally non-self-executing are an exception to
this proposition. 24

23. This is not a defense of footnote 2 of Medellín, however, as the Court in Medellín
clearly did not hold that the treatymakers lacked the power to provide for direct enforceability
of ICJ judgments. See Medellín, 552 U.S. at 519 (“We do not suggest that treaties can never
afford binding domestic effect to international tribunal judgments . . . .”).
24. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES: TREATIES § 106 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST., April Discussion Draft 2015) provides that,
“[i]n exceptional circumstances . . . the Constitution may require legislation before the
judiciary may regard a treaty provision as enforceable by the judiciary, thereby limiting the
significance of any intent or understanding concerning self-execution on the part of the U.S.
treatymakers.” Insofar as it suggests that such intent plays a “limit[ed]” role, the draft
overstates the role of the intent of the U.S. treatymakers with respect to this sort of treaty. Id.
The treatymakers’ intent is relevant to determining what the international obligation is, but (as
explained above and implicitly recognized in Comment g) their intent regarding self-execution
plays no role at all in determining whether the treaty is self-executing. On the other hand, the
draft understates the effect of a conclusion that a treaty is non-self-executing for constitutional
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The draft’s (implicit) recognition that this is a distinct category
of non-self-execution is important. It means that the self-execution
concept is not a unitary one. The draft should expressly recognize
the non-unitary character of the self-execution doctrine. Doing so
would do much to clarify much of the confusion that currently
surrounds this doctrine.
B. The Distinctness of the Justiciability Category
The current draft does not recognize the justiciability category
as distinct from the intent-based category. Comment e includes
among the “[c]onsiderations relevant to determining selfexecution” 25 “whether a treaty provision is sufficiently precise or
obligatory for judicial application.” 26 But the current draft appears
to regard this and the other considerations discussed in Comment e
as evidence of the intent of the U.S. treatymakers regarding the
treaty’s direct judicial enforceability. 27 The better view is that this
“consideration” is a wholly distinct reason for finding a treaty not
to be judicially enforceable.
As noted above, the justiciability category consists of treaties that
may not be enforced directly in court because they are too vague or
call for judgments not of a judicial nature. This version of the nonself-execution doctrine is analogous to the political question
doctrine. Just as some constitutional principles are non-justiciable
because of a lack of judicially manageable standards, or because their
adjudication requires a policy determination of a kind clearly for
non-judicial discretion, 28 treaties that are “too vague for judicial
enforcement” 29 or that call for the exercise of non-judicial judgments
reasons when it suggests that the constitutional question is relevant only to whether “the judiciary
may regard a treaty provision as enforceable by the judiciary.” Id. As discussed above, to the
extent the treaty purports to do what may only be done by the lawmakers, the treaty lacks the
force of valid domestic law and is unenforceable by any domestic law-applying officials.
25. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES:
TREATIES § 106 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST., April Discussion Draft 2015) (emphasis omitted).
26. Id.
27. Id. at cmt. d (explaining that, in the absence of a clear statement on the
issue, the treatymakers’ “intent or understanding commonly is determined in light of a
range of considerations”).
28. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210–13 (1962).
29. See Saipan v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 502 F.2d 90, 99 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 1003 (1975).

1755

9.VAZQUEZ.FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

5/6/2016 8:02 AM

2015

are the supreme law of the land, but they are not judicially
enforceable because of limitations on the power of the courts in our
system of government. A common example of such a treaty is one
that imposes an obligation on parties to use their best efforts to
accomplish certain goals. 30 Determining the best efforts the nation
can use to accomplish the specified goals requires the weighing and
balancing of disparate demands on the nation’s resources, which, in
our system of government, is the type of judgment not allocated to
the courts. 31
With respect to the justiciability category, the self-execution
question is essentially about judicial enforceability. But whether a
treaty is non-self-executing in this sense does not turn on anyone’s
intent. Rather, the non-self-executing character of this type of treaty,
like the non-self-executing character of treaties that purport to do
what may only be done by statute, is based on the Constitution.
Unlike the constitutionality category, the justiciability category is not
based on the Constitution’s allocation of certain law-making powers
to the law-makers rather than the treatymakers. Instead, it is based
on the Constitution’s allocation of enforcement powers to the
political branches rather than the judicial branch.
Because the conclusion that a treaty is nonjusticiable turns on
constitutional principles regarding the role of the courts with
respect to certain types of norms, the non-self-executing character
of these treaties does not turn on anyone’s intent. If the treaty
imposed an obligation to use best efforts to accomplish certain
goals, or imposed a general obligation to, for example,
“promot[e] . . . human rights,” 32 such an obligation would require
implementation by the political branches because compliance with
it requires judgments that, under our Constitution, are not for the
courts to make. This would be so even if it could be shown that the

30. See Judicial Enforcement, supra note 4, at 631. (internal quotation marks omitted).
31. See id. The best explanation of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Medellín is that the
Court found Article 94 to be non-self-executing for this reason. See id. at 660–65. The Court
appears to have interpreted the provision’s statement that the United States “undertakes to
comply” with the judgments of the ICJ as imposing an obligation to endeavor or use its best
efforts to comply. See discussion infra Part III.
32. See U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 3.
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parties or the U.S. treatymakers intended that the obligation be
directly enforceable in court. 33
The draft comes close to recognizing the distinctness of the
justiciability category when it explains in Comment e that “whether a
treaty provision is sufficiently precise or obligatory” is important to
the self-execution inquiry because it tells us “whether a treaty
provision is appropriate as such for judicial application.” 34 That
treaties are non-self-executing when they are inappropriate for
judicial enforcement appears to be an accurate description of how
many lower courts have been approaching the self-execution issue in
recent years. 35 But, though the courts have sometimes treated this
question as an indirect way of ascertaining whether the treaty was
“‘intended’ to be self-executing,” 36 their analyses show that they
have really been making their own assessments of “appropriateness.”
The issue in these cases turned on “a purely constructive intent
(which is to say, not intent at all).” 37
The question whether a treaty provision is “appropriate for
judicial enforcement” turns on constitutional considerations about
the appropriate role of the courts in our governmental system with
respect to particular types of legal obligations. The relevant
considerations are those set out in Baker v. Carr, 38 most relevantly
the existence of judicially manageable standards and the need for
policy judgments of a nonjudicial nature. 39 If the treatymakers had an
actual intent on the matter, that intent should be taken into account
as part of the intent-based analysis. Otherwise, the courts should
determine the appropriateness of judicial enforcement by reference
to generally applicable constitutional considerations. To lump the
justiciability category of non-self-execution in with the category that
33. And it would also be so even if the obligation were one that the courts of other
countries would enforce.
34. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES: TREATIES § 106 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST., April Discussion Draft 2015).
35. This was my conclusion twenty years ago. See Four Doctrines, supra note 4, at 711.
36. See id. (quoting Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370, 373
(7th Cir. 1985)).
37. Id. The courts taking this approach “did not search for an actual intent or even
infer an intent; [they] imputed an intent based on” factors they considered relevant to the
question of appropriateness. Id.
38. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210–13 (1962).
39. See generally Four Doctrines, supra note 4, at 711–18.
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turns on an actual intent regarding self-execution would produce
confusion, inviting the courts to project onto the treatymakers their
own sense of the “appropriateness” of judicial enforcement. 40
Because this category turns on constitutional notions of the
judicial role rather than on intent, it should be distinguished from
the intent-based category discussed in Section 106(2). 41 It could
perhaps be considered part of the constitutional category discussed
in Section 106(3), since the need for an implementing statute turns
on constitutional considerations. 42 That subsection’s statement that
“[c]ourts will regard a treaty provision as non-self-executing to the
extent that implementing legislation is constitutionally required”
would appear to apply to nonjusticiable treaty provisions, under my
analysis. 43 The comments and reporters’ notes make clear that
Section 106(3) is intended to cover only treaties that purport to
accomplish what may only be done by statute, and the draft clearly
regards the justiciability consideration as part of the intent-based
category covered in Section 106(2). But it might be argued that, if
one accepts the argument that this category of non-self-execution
turns on constitutional considerations rather than intent, the better
solution would be to group nonjusticiable with unconstitutional
treaties under Section 106(3).
It would be preferable, however, to recognize the justiciability
category as a third distinct category on non-self-executing treaties.
Having implicitly recognized the constitutional category as a distinct
one, there is little reason to limit the number of categories to two.
The constitutional considerations relevant to determining whether a
40. Professor Ramsey would collapse the “justiciability” and “intent-based” categories
into a single category consisting of treaties that “call for actions that in the U.S. legal system
are not appropriately undertaken by courts.” Michael D. Ramsey, A Textual Approach to Treaty
Non-Self-Execution, 2015 BYU L. REV. 1639, 1651 (2016). Although the two categories do
overlap, I regard it as useful to distinguish, as Professor Ramsey does in the helpful restatement
he provides in his conclusion, between treaties that “call[] for action outside the constitutional
judicial power of the U.S. courts” (which fall within my “justiciability” category) and “treaties
that expressly or implicitly call for legislative or other non-judicial action, or preclude judicial
remedies” (which fall into my intent-based category). See id. at 1670–71. Professor Ramsey
“prefer[s] to emphasize the conceptual similarity of the two,” see id at 1658–59 n.67; in my
view, distinguishing the two categories would promote analytical clarity.
41. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES: TREATIES § 106(2) (AM. LAW INST., April Discussion Draft 2015).
42. Id. § 106(3).
43. Id.
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treaty is nonjusticiable differ entirely from those that determine
whether a treaty is constitutional in the sense contemplated by
present Section 106(3). In the case of nonjusticiable treaties, the
issue turns on a constitutional disability of the courts, whereas in the
latter category, the issue turns on a constitutional disability of the
treatymakers. Finally, the draft’s claim that self-execution is
essentially about judicial enforceability is true of the justiciability
category but not of the constitutionality category covered by present
Section 106(3).
C. The Distinctness of the Private-Right-of-Action Issue
The fourth category of non-self-executing treaties consists of
treaties that do not, of their own force, create a private right of
action. The current draft clearly recognizes that this issue is distinct
from the two categories of non-self-executing treaties it recognizes.
It does so, however, by insisting that whether a treaty creates a
private right of action is not really a “self-execution” issue at all. In
this respect, the current draft follows the Restatement (Third). 44
The draft does not explain why this issue is not properly
regarded as a self-execution issue. Cutting against the drafts’
position is the fact that the courts commonly use the term “selfexecuting” to refer to the question whether a treaty creates a
private right of action. 45 This use of the term is consistent with its
use in ordinary legal discourse. 46 For example, the Supreme Court
has described the Takings Clause as self-executing because it
establishes a remedy for its violation (“just compensation”). 47 The
current draft itself recognizes that the issue of whether statutes
create a private right of action is analogous to the issue of self-

44. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES, § 111 (AM. LAW INST. 1987).
45. See cases cited in Four Doctrines, supra note 4, at 719 n.114.
46. See generally Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of
Individuals, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1082, 1117–18 (1992) [hereinafter Treaty-Based Rights
and Remedies].
47. See, e.g., First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482
U.S. 304, 305 (1987); United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980); United States v.
Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 401 (1976).
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execution of treaties, 48 and that the executive branch has regarded
the issue of the self-execution of treaties as relating to whether the
treaty creates a private right of action. 49
The draft’s position must, then, be based on the view that the
term “self-execution” is a term of art with respect to treaties. But, as
we have already seen, the concept of self-execution is not a unitary
one. The current draft implicitly recognizes two distinct types of
reasons why a treaty might be non-self-executing, and comes close to
recognizing a third. If the reporters are willing to recognize that selfexecution is not a unitary concept with respect to treaties, it is
unclear on what basis it insists that the issue whether the treaty
creates a private right of action is not also properly regarded as one
of self-execution. What is it that the three categories of self-executing
treaties have in common that distinguishes them from the fourth?
Perhaps the reporters would answer that the unifying thread is
that the three true categories are essentially about the judicial
enforceability vel non of a treaty, whereas the fourth category relates
only to remedies. Even if a treaty does not create a private right of
action, it may be enforceable in court defensively, or pursuant to
rights of action created by statutes, such as the APA or Section
1983. 50 I have argued that the “constitutionality” category of nonself-execution is not just about judicial enforceability, and I shall
argue below that the same is true of the intent-based category. 51 But
it is true that a treaty that is non-self-executing in any of the three
senses discussed above will not be judicially enforceable at all. Thus,
lack of judicial enforceability is a characteristic of treaties that are
non-self-executing in the first three senses that is not shared by
treaties that do not create a private right of action.

48. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES: TREATIES § 106 reporters’ note 6 (AM. LAW INST., April Discussion Draft 2015)
(attempting to reconcile non-self-execution of treaties with the Supremacy Clause by noting
that “[j]udicial enforcement of statutes can also be limited, such as by disallowing private
enforcement” (citing Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979))).
49. Id. at reporters’ note 4 (discussing S. Exec. Rep. 102–23 (102d Cong., 2d Sess.),
which explains that the declaration of non-self-execution attached to the ICCPR was intended
to “clarify that the Covenant will not create a private cause of action in U.S. courts”).
50. See Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies, supra note 46, at 1142–57 (discussing
enforcement rights of action to enforce treaties under the APA and 28 U.S.C. § 1983).
51. See infra Part II.
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Whether this is a sufficient basis for insisting that the private
right of action issue does not relate to self-execution is debatable.
Insisting that the private right of action issue is separate from selfexecution may suggest erroneously that the self-execution concept is
a unitary one. Treating the issue of private rights of action as a selfexecution issue, on the other hand, would reinforce the idea that
there isn’t a single doctrine of self-execution. Rather, treaties might
be non-self-executing for a number of different reasons, with varying
consequences not just for courts but for other branches. 52 If the
Restatement (Fourth) does take the position that that the term “selfexecuting” is a term of art with respect to treaties, referring only to
reasons why a treaty might be entirely unenforceable in court, it
should couple any such stipulation with an explicit statement that
this term of art encompasses three distinct types of reasons why a
treaty might be judicially unenforceable.
II. WHAT SELF-EXECUTION IS ESSENTIALLY ABOUT
The draft Restatement (Fourth) takes the position that the selfexecution issue is essentially about the treaty’s judicial enforceability.
Comment b indicates that “[t]he essential inquiry for selfexecution . . . is whether a treaty provision is directly enforceable by
the courts.” 53 The black letter of Section 106 indicates that, “[i]n
determining whether a treaty provision is self-executing, courts will
evaluate whether, in light of the provision’s terms and the treaty as a
whole, the U.S. treatymakers intended or understood the provision
to be directly enforceable by the judiciary.” 54 We have already seen
that self-execution doesn’t always turn on intent. 55 As will be
explained in Part III, when the issue does turn on intent, it does not
52. Indeed, there might be an infinite number of respects in which a treaty might be
non-self-executing, as the term is used in ordinary legal discourse—for example, a treaty might
be said to be non-self-executing if it fails to create a particular remedy for its violation, such as
exclusion of evidence (see Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 347 (2006))—just as
there are an infinite number of ways in which another type of law might be self-executing (or
not) (see Four Doctrines, supra note 4, at 723 n.140).
53. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES: TREATIES § 106 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST., April Discussion Draft 2015).
54. Id. § 106(2). See also id. § 106 reporters’ note 1 (noting that the Court in Medellín
asked whether the relevant treaties “reflected an intent ‘to vest ICJ decisions with immediate
legal effect in domestic courts.’” (quoting Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 508 (2008)).
55. See supra Section I.A.
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always turn on the intent of the U.S. treatymakers. This Part
considers the draft’s claim that the self-execution issue is essentially
about judicial enforceability. 56
As noted in Part I, the common thread linking the categories of
non-self-execution recognized in the draft, and distinguishing what
the draft appears to regard as true from false non-self-execution, is
that treaties that are non-self-executing in the proper sense of the
term are always judicially unenforceable. It is only in that sense that
the draft can plausibly maintain—by stipulation—that self-execution
is essentially about judicial enforceability. But, as we have already
seen, the reasons for finding a treaty non-self-executing, and hence
judicially unenforceable, vary. And, while the self-execution issue
with respect to treaties that are non-self-executing in the justiciability
sense might essentially be about judicial enforceability, the
consequences of non-self-execution for treaties that are non-selfexecuting in the constitutional sense extend well beyond the courts.
The claim that self-execution is essentially about judicial
enforceability is perhaps most problematic with respect to the intentbased category of non-self-execution—the category on which the
current draft mostly focuses. With respect to this category of nonself-execution, a source of confusion for the courts has been what
sort of “intent” is relevant. Courts and commentators have generally
looked for an intent regarding what they have considered the selfexecution issue to be “essentially” about. The Court in Medellín
regarded the self-execution issue as essentially about whether the
treaty had the force of domestic law. 57 Consistent with this
understanding of the self-execution issue, the Court asserted that
whether a treaty is self-executing depends on whether “a treaty’s
terms reflect a determination by the President who negotiated it and
the Senate that confirmed it that the treaty has domestic effect.”58
The draft Restatement (Fourth) rejects the idea that a non-self-

56. As discussed infra text accompanying notes 82–85, the draft is not entirely
consistent in this regard. Some parts of Reporters’ Note 2 are consistent with the analysis
presented in this Part. But those parts are inconsistent with the statements quoted in this
paragraph. In this Part, I shall assume that the draft’s view on this issue is the one stated in the
black letter and comments rather than the conflicting statements in Reporters’ Note 2. In any
event, the draft is in need of clarification on this point.
57. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
58. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 521.
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executing treaty is one that lacks the force of domestic law, and
asserts instead that self-execution is essentially about judicial
enforceability. It thus concludes that self-execution turns on
“whether . . . the U.S. treatymakers intended or understood the
provision to be directly enforceable by the judiciary.” 59
As the doctrine was originally articulated by the Supreme Court,
however, self-execution did not turn on intent about either domestic
legal force or judicial enforceability. The question, rather, was
whether the relevant treaty provision “acted directly” on the subject
or instead imposed an obligation to pass legislation accomplishing
certain aims. This was clearly how the Court understood the
doctrine in Foster v. Neilsen, 60 the case that introduced the distinction
between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties.
Chief Justice Marshall began his analysis by recognizing that the
Supremacy Clause declares treaties to be the law of the land and that,
consequently, treaties are generally “to be regarded in courts of
justice as equivalent to an act of the Legislature.” 61 But the Court
recognized an exception to the proposition that treaties are generally
enforceable in court: This is so “whenever [the treaty] operates of
itself, without the aid of any legislative provision.” 62 “[W]hen the
terms of the stipulation import a contract, when either of the parties
engages to perform a particular act, the treaty addresses itself to the
political, not the judicial department; and the legislature must
execute the contract before it can become a rule for the Court.” 63
This latter qualification of the general rule that treaties are judicially
enforceable to the same extent as statutes is the basis of the
distinction between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties.
The Foster opinion shows that the Court viewed the treaty in
that case to be non-self-executing by virtue of the treaty itself. Thus,
this category of self-execution differs from the two categories
described above (the constitutionality and justiciability categories),
which involved treaties that were non-self-executing by virtue of the

59. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES: TREATIES § 106(2) (AM. LAW INST., April Discussion Draft 2015).
60. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314–15 (1829).
61. Id. at 254.
62. Id.
63. Id.
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Constitution. 64 In the Court’s words, implementing legislation is
required because the treaty “addresses itself to the political
[branches].” 65 While the two categories of non-self-executing treaties
discussed in Part I are non-self-executing by operation of the
Constitution, regardless of any intent regarding self-execution,
treaties are non-self-executing in the Foster sense by operation of the
treaty itself. Self-execution turns on the content of the treaty
obligation, which is, in important respects, a matter of intent. 66
Foster makes clear that the question is not whether the treaty
reflects an intent that the treaty have the force of domestic law or
that it be judicially enforceable. As already noted, the Court
recognized that the Supremacy Clause gives all U.S. treaties the
force of domestic law. Treaties that are non-self-executing in the
Foster sense are not judicially enforceable despite being the law of the
land. As the current draft correctly notes, the Court in Foster did not
question “the broader status of ‘all’ treaties as supreme law.” 67
Nor did the Court, in deciding whether the treaty before it was
self-executing, look for an indication that the treaty was intended to
be judicially enforceable. Rather, it asked whether the treaty “act[ed]
directly on” the subject or instead constituted a promise to pass
legislation. As noted above, the Court in Foster understood that a
treaty is non-self-executing when either of the parties “engages to
perform a particular act.” It went on to clarify that the question is
whether the parties engaged to perform a legislative act. The relevant
article of the treaty provided, in its English version, that the United
States “shall ratify and confirm” certain Spanish grants of land. The
self-execution question, as the Court posed it, was: “Do these words
act directly on the grants so as to give validity to those not otherwise
valid; or do they pledge the faith of the United States to pass acts
which shall ratify and confirm them?” 68 The Court elaborated: “The
article [under consideration] does not declare that all the grants

64. See supra Sections I.A. & I.B.
65. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 254 (emphasis added).
66. On the role of intent in treaty interpretation, see infra note 87.
67. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES: TREATIES § 106 reporters’ note 6 (AM. LAW INST., April Discussion Draft 2015).
68. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 314–15 (emphasis added). See also United States v. Percheman,
32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 89 (1833) (noting, in light of the Spanish text, that the treaty was selfexecuting because it did not “stipulat[e] for some future legislative act”).
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made by his catholic majesty before the 24th of January, 1818, shall
be valid to the same extent as if the ceded territories had remained
under his dominion. It does not say that those grants are hereby
confirmed.” 69 “Had such been its language,” the Court wrote, the
article would have been self-executing, and, as a result, “it would
have acted directly on the subject, and would have repealed those
acts of Congress which were repugnant to it.” 70 But since the article
provided instead that the grants “shall be ratified and confirmed,” it
was non-self-executing and thus required implementation through
legislation. “Until such act shall be passed, the Court is not at liberty
to disregard the existing laws on the subject.” 71
The Court in Foster thus found the treaty not to be judicially
enforceable because it did not purport to alter the rights and
obligations of the parties before the court but rather imposed an
obligation to enact legislation to accomplish the treaty’s particular
aims. 72 So understood, a non-self-executing treaty is like a statute
that delegates law-making power to an agency. 73 Such a statute

69. Foster, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 254.
70. Id. at 314–15.
71. Id.
72. According to Professor Sloss, the Court’s analysis in Foster consisted of two distinct
steps. In the first step, the Court interpreted the treaty and concluded that it did not impose
an immediate obligation to recognize Spanish grants as valid. The conclusion that an act of
Congress was required to accomplish the treaty’s goals, however, was based on a separate
separation of powers analysis, not on intent. See Sloss, supra note 16, at 1716; David Sloss,
Executing Foster v. Neilson: The Two-Step Approach to Analyzing Self-Executing Treaties, 53
HARV. INT’L L.J. 135 (2012). It is true that the nature of the international obligation imposed
by a treaty is distinct from the question whether legislation is required to implement the treaty
for any given state-party, and that the latter is a question of each state-party’s domestic law.
Thus, as noted below, in the United Kingdom, implementing legislation is required regardless
of the intent of the treaty-makers or the content of the international obligation. The rule in
the United States might have been that treaties can be enforced by the courts without
implementing legislation even if the treaty does not purport to “act upon the subject.” See
Vázquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 4, at 703. But Marshall in Foster blurred the two issues,
holding that legislation was required because the international obligation imposed by the
treaty was not one that “act[ed] directly upon the subject.” Professor Sloss acknowledges that
the second step of Chief Justice Marshall’s analysis was “implicit.” See Sloss, supra note 16, at
1717. For my part, I agree that the Foster opinion “disguises an important separation of
powers holding.” Vázquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 4, at 703; see also Carlos M. Vázquez,
Chief Justices Marshall and Roberts and the Non-Self-Execution of Treaties, 53 HARV. INT’L L.J.
ONLINE 213 (2012) (discussing Professor Sloss’s two-step interpretation of Foster).
73. See United Shoe Mach. Co. v. Duplessis Shoe Mach. Co., 155 F. 842, 845 (1st Cir.
1907); see generally Adam M. Samaha, Self-Executing Statutes in the Administrative State, in
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generally sets forth the aims to be achieved but does not purport to
alter the rights and obligations of private parties of its own force.
Until the agency enacts the contemplated regulations, the rights and
obligations of private parties remain as before, and, in the words of
the Court in Foster, the courts “are not at liberty to disregard the
existing laws on the subject.” 74
Foster thus establishes that, to the extent self-execution turns on
intent, it does not turn on intent regarding judicial enforceability.
Lack of judicial enforceability follows from the fact that the treaty
does not purport, of its own force, to alter the rights and obligations
of individuals. The Foster opinion also establishes that intent-based
non-self-execution—like the constitutionality category but unlike the
justiciability category—is not “essentially” about judicial
enforceability. To be sure, the Court did state that, when confronted
with a non-self-executing treaty, courts are not at liberty to disregard
the preexisting law, 75 and that a self-executing treaty is “to be
regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the
legislature . . . .” 76 But this does not mean, as the draft contends,
that “Chief Justice Marshall addressed non-self-execution as a matter
of judicial enforceability” only. 77 The Court’s reference to courts’
lack of power to enforce non-self-executing treaties is
understandable, as the treaty had been invoked in a judicial
proceeding and the immediate question before the Court was
whether it was enforceable in this context. But the Court’s reasoning
shows that the consequences of Foster-type non-self-execution apply
equally to executive officials, both state and federal. Because the
treaty leaves unaltered the preexisting rights and obligations of
private individuals, it is clear that executive officials and private
individuals, not just judges, are legally obligated to abide by the
rights and obligations established by preexisting law.
After the Foster decision, the Supreme Court did not deny relief
on the ground that the treaty being invoked was non-self-executing
THE TIMING OF LEGAL INTERVENTION (Frank Fagan & Saul Levmore eds., forthcoming
2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2720309.
74. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 254.
75. Id. at 315; see also United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 52 (1833).
76. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 314 (emphasis added).
77. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES: TREATIES § 106 reporters’ note 6 (AM. LAW INST., April Discussion Draft 2015).
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until the very recent decision in Medellín v. Texas. 78 None of the
Court’s intervening decisions requires a reevaluation of the
conclusions reached above on the basis of Foster. Medellín does
contain some language in tension with the foregoing analysis of
Foster, but, as noted above and discussed further below, Medellín
takes the position that the self-execution issue is essentially about
whether the treaty has the force of domestic law, a conceptualization
that the current draft properly rejects. 79 The reporters are right to
counsel against generalizing too much from Medellín, 80 since the
opinion provides contradictory indications regarding the nature of
the self-execution inquiry. Indeed, in agreeing with the executive
branch’s argument that the relevant treaty required legislative
implementation, the Court in Medellín endorsed Foster’s formulation
of the issue as whether the treaty’s text “‘act[ed] directly on [the
subject of the treaty]’” or instead “pledged the faith of the United
States to pass acts” to accomplish the treaty’s aims. 81 Far from
rejecting Foster’s conceptualization of the self-execution issue, the
majority in Medellín purported to be adhering to it.
The draft Restatement (Fourth) provides mixed signals regarding
the essential nature of the self-execution inquiry. Reporters’ Note 2
is largely consistent with the above analysis. Quoting Foster, the note
explains that, in determining whether a treaty is self-executing,
“[t]he ultimate question is whether the treaty is one that ‘operates of
itself without the aid of any legislative provision,’ or rather ‘addresses
itself to the political, not the judicial department.’” 82 The reporters’
note goes on to say that “[t]he prevailing approach to selfexecution . . . focuses on whether a treaty provision is appropriate for
direct judicial application, based on the international obligations of the
United States as they would have been understood by the U.S.
treatymakers.” 83 This statement’s recognition that the self-execution

78. But cf. supra note 4 (noting that Cameron Septic Tank is a possible exception).
79. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
80. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
81. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 508 (2008) (quoting Foster, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at
314–15).
82. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES: TREATIES § 106 reporters’ note 2 (AM. LAW INST., April Discussion Draft 2015)
(quoting Foster, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 314).
83. Id. (emphasis added).
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determination is “based on the international obligations of the
United States” is consistent with the Foster analysis. 84 The
statement’s focus on appropriateness for judicial application harkens
back to the claim that self-execution is essentially about judicial
enforceability. But, as discussed in Part I, whether a treaty is
“appropriate for direct judicial application” would not appear to be a
matter of intent at all.
The examples given in the reporters’ note of “considerations
relevant to determining self-execution” are consistent with the
conclusion that, to the extent the issue does turn on intent, it turns
on intent regarding whether the obligation imposed by the treaty is
one to “pass acts” accomplishing certain aims. The first
consideration discussed in the reporters’ note—“whether the treaty
provision is sufficiently precise or obligatory to be suitable for direct
application by the judiciary” 85—is better understood as
constitutionally based, that is as the application of the political
question doctrine to treaties. So understood, it does not turn on
intent at all. The second “consideration” discussed in Reporters’
Note 2 is whether the treaty “imposes obligations or creates
authorities designed to have immediate effect, as opposed to
contemplating additional legal measures.” 86 This seems consistent
with the view, drawn above from Foster, that the self-executing
character of a treaty turns on whether it “acts upon the subject” or
instead imposes an obligation to “pass acts” to accomplish the
treaty’s goals. As discussed above, this is a matter of treaty
interpretation. The inquiry is about whether the treaty purports itself
to alter the rights and obligations of the parties or instead calls for
the enactment of legislation to accomplish its ends.
As noted at the beginning of this Part, however, other portions
of the draft Restatement (Fourth) rather clearly state that the selfexecution issue is essentially about judicial enforceability. On this
point, Reporters’ Note 2 seems out of step with the rest of Section
106. For the reasons discussed above, however, Reporters’ Note 2 is
84. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES: TREATIES § 106 reporters’ note 2 (AM. LAW INST., April Discussion Draft 2015).
What the statement suggests about the weight to be given to the views of the U.S.
treatymakers is discussed in Part III.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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more faithful to the guidance provided by the Supreme Court in
Foster regarding the nature of the self-execution inquiry than are the
other portions of the Section 106. It is true that treaties that are
non-self-executing (in the senses recognized by the current draft) are
not judicially enforceable, but their unenforceability in the courts is a
consequence of their non-self-executing character, not the cause.
Moreover, it is only one of the consequences. It is thus not true that
the “essential inquiry” for self-execution is whether the treaty
provision is enforceable by the courts.
III. THE RELEVANCE OF THE INTENT OF THE U.S. TREATYMAKERS
The Foster decision also provides rather clear guidance about
whose intent matters. As the Court approached the issue in Foster,
the self-executing character of a treaty turned on the content of the
treaty itself—specifically on whether the treaty purported to act upon
the subject or, instead, imposed an obligation to pass legislation to
accomplish certain aims. The question is one of treaty interpretation,
and, in treaty interpretation, the relevant intent is that of the parties
to the treaty, not the unilateral intent of one of the parties. 87
The intent of the U.S. treatymakers is of course relevant to the
determination of the intent of the parties, as it reflects the
understanding of one of the parties. But it is just one type of
evidence. The treaty’s meaning turns on the joint intent of the
parties. It is perhaps appropriate for a U.S. court to defer to the
declared intentions of the U.S. treatymakers in interpreting a treaty if
the meaning is ambiguous. 88 But, if the question is one of treaty
87. Interpreting a treaty is not wholly a matter of ascertaining the actual intent of the
parties. For the rules of international law on treaty interpretation, see Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties arts. 31–33 May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. The extent to which the
treaty’s text functions merely as evidence of the parties’ intentions or is binding even if it
diverges from what the parties intended has been the subject of debate. See Draft Articles on
the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, Int’l L. Comm’n art. 27 cmt. 2 (1966), reprinted in
[1966] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n, U.N. Doc A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add.1. Because treaty
interpretation is not entirely a matter of intent, perhaps a more accurate name for this category
of non-self-execution would be “treaty-based non-self-execution.” This label has the benefit of
conveying that the main distinction between this category and the other two categories is that,
with respect to this category, the treaty’s non-self-executing character derives from the treaty
itself, as opposed to the Constitution.
88. Customary international law includes rules for interpreting treaties whose texts are
ambiguous, and those rules do not provide for deference to the views of one of the treaty
parties. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 87, at art. 32. Conceivably,
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interpretation, the ultimate question is what the treaty means, and
the expressed intent of the U.S. treatymakers is relevant solely as
evidence of that meaning.
A. The Draft Restatement (Fourth)’s Position on the Role of the Intent
of the U.S. Treatymakers
The draft Restatement (Fourth) repeatedly stresses the
importance of the intent of the U.S. treatymakers. But the draft gives
mixed signals regarding whether it views the intent of the U.S.
treatymakers as itself determining the self-executing character of the
treaty, and thus as binding and conclusive, or instead merely as
evidence of the meaning of the treaty, entitled to deference but not
itself binding. The draft provides some support for the latter view,
but seems in the end to embrace the former view.
That the intent or understanding of the U.S. treatymakers is
merely entitled to deference as evidence of the meaning of the treaty
is supported by the black letter of Section 106(2), which provides in
its second sentence that, “[i]f the Senate specifies in its resolution of
advice and consent that a treaty provision is self-executing or nonself-executing, courts will defer to this specification.” 89 This
formulation suggests that that intent of the U.S. treatymakers is not
itself what makes a treaty self-executing or non-self-executing. Such
specifications are, as the draft Restatement (Fourth) makes clear in
Section 106, Comment d, “clear express[ions]” of the U.S.
treatymakers’ intent regarding self-execution. 90 If the self-executing
or non-self-executing character of a treaty turned on the intent of
the U.S. treatymakers, these declarations would be conclusive and
binding on the courts. Subsection 2’s assertion that the courts
merely “defer” to these declarations suggests that the reporters view
the intent of the U.S. treatymakers to be relevant as evidence of the
meaning of the treaty. The courts will perhaps give greater weight to
the expressed intent of the U.S. treatymakers than of the negotiators
from other parties. But when a court defers to the views of the U.S.

our domestic rules of treaty interpretation could diverge from these international rules by
privileging the views of our treatymakers. Whether it does so is beyond the scope of this article.
89. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES: TREATIES § 106 reporters’ note 3 (AM. LAW INST., April Discussion Draft 2015).
90. Id. § 106 cmt. d.
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treatymakers, it, by definition, does not treat those views as binding
or conclusive; in the face of persuasive evidence to the contrary, the
court could reject the views of the U.S. treatymakers.
That the reporters do not understand the U.S. treatymakers’
intent or understanding as binding is also suggested by the
statement in Comment b that “the question of self-execution is one
for judicial resolution” as to which the U.S. treatymakers “may
provide critical input.” 91 If the views of the U.S. treatymakers are
merely “critical input” contributing to the authoritative resolution
of the question by the courts, those views are not themselves
binding or authoritative.
Reporters’ Note 2 is more ambiguous. As discussed above, this
note states that “[t]he prevailing approach to self-execution . . .
focuses on whether a treaty provision is appropriate for direct judicial
application, based on the international obligations of the United
States as they would have been understood by the U.S.
treatymakers.” 92 By affirming that the issue is based on “the
international obligation” of the United States, the note seems to
indicate that it is the intent of the parties that controls. The
understanding of the U.S. treatymakers is evidence of the treaty’s
meaning, but it is not conclusive. But the note refers to “the
international obligations of the United States as they would have been
understood by the U.S. treatymakers.” 93 The note might be saying that
the ultimate question is how the U.S. treatymakers understood the
nature of the obligation imposed by the treaty. If so, then the views
of the U.S. treatymakers would be conclusive for the courts. 94
Alternatively, the note might be saying that the U.S. treatymakers’
understanding of the meaning of the treaty on the question whether
the treaty purports to act upon the subject is entitled to strong
deference but is not conclusive. This interpretation would be more

91. Id. § 106 cmt. b.
92. Id. § 106 reporters’ note 2.
93. Id. (emphasis added).
94. As discussed in Part II, the relevant understanding is still about whether the treaty
acts upon the subject, not about whether the treaty is judicially enforceable. See supra notes
60–81 and accompanying text. Judicial enforceability follows from the fact that the treaty
purports to act upon the subject, and lack of judicial enforceability from the fact that the treaty
does not purport to act upon the subject. Still, Reporter’s Note 2 may be saying that the views
of the U.S. treatymakers are conclusive on this question for the courts.
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consistent with the second sentence of Section 106(2). It is also
supported by the statement in Comment e that, in resolving the selfexecution question, “courts have looked to the international
obligations of the United States, construed according to
conventional methods of treaty interpretation, as they would have
been understood by the U.S. treatymakers,” and by the more general
statement, later in Reporters’ Note 2, that, “[a]s with other
questions involving treaty interpretation, courts will attribute ‘great
weight’ to the executive branch’s position.” 95
But these indications that the intent or understanding of the
U.S. treatymakers is entitled to deference as evidence of the
meaning of the treaty are contradicted by other portions of the
draft Restatement (Fourth), which fairly clearly reflect the view that
the intent of the U.S. treatymakers is itself what makes a treaty selfexecuting or not. Comment d claims that “the Supreme Court has
indicated that whether a treaty provision is self-executing is
normally determined by the intent or understanding of the U.S.
treatymakers, rather than the collective intent of the states that are
parties to the treaty.” 96 In contrast to the second sentence of
Section 106(2), stating that such intent is entitled to deference, the
first sentence of Section 106(2) provides that, “[i]n determining
whether a treaty provision is self-executing, courts will evaluate
whether, in light of the provision’s terms and the treaty as a whole,
the U.S. treatymakers intended or understood the provision to be
directly enforceable by the judiciary.” 97 This suggests that the intent
or understanding of the U.S. treatymakers is relevant more than
just as evidence of the meaning of the treaty. 98 Indeed, it suggests
that the treaty itself (“the provision’s terms and the treaty as a
whole”) is relevant as evidence of the intent of the U.S.
treatymakers. 99 This appears to be confirmed by Reporters’ Note 2,
which states that, even when the text of the treaty “indicate[s] that
it is to be immediately effective in the U.S. legal system without the
95. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES: TREATIES § 106 reporters’ note 2 (AM. LAW INST., April Discussion Draft 2015).
(quoting Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 513 (2008)).
96. Id. § 106 cmt. d.
97. Id. §106(2).
98. See also id. §106 cmt. d.
99. Id. §106(2).
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need for prior legislation,” or when the text “indicate[s] that it is to
be given effect initially through legislative or administrative
implementation rather than through judicial enforcement,” these
texts are relevant to the self-execution inquiry insofar as they “may
have a bearing on the intent or understanding of the U.S.
treatymakers.” 100 Thus, rather than regarding the intent of the U.S.
treatymakers as evidence of the meaning of the treaty, the draft
regards the treaty itself to be mere evidence of the intent of the
U.S. treatymakers on the self-execution issue.
That the reporters regard the intent of the U.S. treatymakers as
binding and authoritative, and not as merely evidence of the
meaning of the treaty entitled to deference, is confirmed by
Reporters’ Note 4, which addresses declarations of self-execution
and of non-self-execution. As already noted, such declarations are
clear expressions of the U.S. treatymakers’ views regarding selfexecution. 101 Reporters’ Note 4 notes that “[c]ourts have generally
treated Senate declarations of non-self-execution as authoritative.” 102
They have done so even though, “in the absence of [such]
declarations, some of the treaty provisions in question would have
been treated by the courts as self-executing . . . [because], for
example, [they] are specific, are mandatory, and concern individual
rights.” 103 The reporters’ note concludes that the validity and
effectiveness of such declarations “appear to reflect an assumption
that the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution does not deprive the
U.S. treatymakers of the ability to determine the domestic judicial
enforceability of treaties.” 104 The reporters then rely on the validity
and effectiveness of such declarations as support for their more
general focus on the intent or understanding of the U.S.
treatymakers as the lodestar for determining the self-executing

100. Id. §106 reporters’ note 2 (emphasis added); see also id. (“Treaty text is often cited
as demonstrating the nature of the obligation as it would have been understood by the
President and the Senate.”).
101. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
102. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES: TREATIES § 106 reporters’ note 4 (AM. LAW INST., April Discussion Draft 2015).
103. Id. (alteration in original).
104. Id.
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nature of treaties, even in the absence of such declarations. 105 This
analysis indicates that the reporters view the intent of the
treatymakers as dispositive, not just as evidence of the treaty’s
meaning—indeed, even when it contradicts the treaty’s meaning.
The treatymakers can, by clearly expressing their intent about selfexecution in a declaration of non-self-execution, control the judicial
enforceability of treaties. And, according to the draft, the fact that
the treatymakers can do this through a non-self-execution
declaration means that their intent on the self-execution issue
controls even in the absence of such a declaration.
In sum, as with the question discussed in Part II, the draft
Restatement (Fourth) points in conflicting directions on the question
of whether the intent of the U.S. treatymakers is relevant as evidence
of the treaty’s meaning, a “critical input” entitled to deference but
not conclusive, or is instead the ultimate determinant of a treaty’s
self-executing status, binding and conclusive for the courts.
Although the former view would be more consistent with the Foster
opinion, the portions of the draft that support this view seem to be
out of step with the overall thrust of the draft, which strongly
suggests that the reporters embrace the latter view. In the remainder
of this Part, I shall assume that the position of the draft Restatement
(Fourth) is that the self-execution issue turns on the intent of the
U.S. treatymakers regarding the judicial enforceability of the treaty,
which intent is binding and conclusive for the courts. In the next
sections, I shall assess the support provided in the draft for those
conclusions and discuss some constitutional problems posed by this
understanding of the doctrine.
B. The Claimed Support for the Draft Restatement (Fourth)’s Position
on Intent
With respect to the claim that self-execution turns on the intent
of the U.S. treatymakers rather than the joint intent of the parties,
the view reflected in the current draft is not a new one. The
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law also took that

105. Id. (“Judicial enforcement of declarations of non-self-execution also supports the
proposition, endorsed in this Section, that self-execution primarily concerns the intent or
understanding of the U.S. treatymakers rather than the collective intent of the various parties
to a treaty.”).
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position. Citing the Restatement (Third), an earlier version of the
draft Restatement (Fourth) reached this conclusion through the
following reasoning:
It is ordinarily up to each nation to decide how to implement its
international obligations. In part because of this, treaties, and
especially multilateral treaties, typically do not address the issue of
domestic implementation. The domestic status of treaties also
varies across domestic legal systems. Whether a treaty provision is
self-executing, therefore, is normally determined by the intent or
understanding of the U.S. treaty makers concerning the issue rather
than the collective intent of the parties to the treaty. 106

The current version abandons this reasoning—a wise move, as the
logic is demonstrably faulty. The first three quoted sentences are
true, but the fourth sentence does not follow from them.
Specifically, it is true that international law ordinarily does not
address how nations are to implement their international
obligations domestically, and that treaties, in particular, ordinarily
do not address the issue of domestic implementation. There is
nothing in international law that prevents parties from addressing
the issue of domestic implementation, and in rare cases a treaty will
do so. This is more likely in the case of a bilateral treaty, or a
plurilateral treaty with few parties. Such a treaty could specify that
the obligations of the United States are subject to legislative
implementation. A multilateral treaty, on the other hand, is highly
unlikely to address issues of domestic implementation, be it the
question whether the treaty directly alters the legal rights and
obligations of individuals or the question whether the treaty is
directly enforceable in court. 107 That is because of the true
proposition stated in the third sentence quoted above: countries
106. See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES: TREATIES § 106 cmts. c, d (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 3, 2014). The first
and fourth quoted sentences paraphrase the Restatement (Third):
In the absence of special agreement, it is ordinarily for the United States to decide
how it will carry out its international obligations. Accordingly, the intention of the
United States determines whether an agreement is to be self-executing in the
United States or should await implementation by legislation or appropriate executive
or administrative action.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 111
cmt. h. (AM. LAW INST. 1987).
107. See Judicial Enforcement, supra note 4, at 633–34.
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have widely varying constitutional rules regarding the domestic
legal effect of treaties. For example, in the United Kingdom and
most countries of the British Commonwealth, treaties always
require legislative implementation if they are to be enforced
domestically. 108 For this reason, a multilateral treaty is highly
unlikely to provide that its provisions directly alter the rights and
obligations of private parties or that they are to be directly enforced
in domestic courts.
Though the first three of the quoted sentences are true, the
fourth sentence is a non sequitur. 109 The first three sentences state
true propositions about international law and practice. If the fourth
sentence followed from the first three, then it would be true for all
nations that the self-executing nature of a treaty would be
determined by the intent of that country’s treatymakers. Yet that is
clearly not the case. For example, as noted, the constitutional rule
in the United Kingdom is that treaties always require implementing
legislation. In the United Kingdom, therefore, it is not true that
the self-executing character of a treaty depends on the intent of the
U.K. treatymakers.
What does follow from the first three sentences is that the selfexecuting nature of a treaty is a matter of each nation’s domestic law,
not international law. But that does not mean that self-execution is
governed by the U.S. treatymakers’ unilateral intent regarding
judicial enforceability. Our domestic constitutional rule is set forth in
the Supremacy Clause. The question we are examining is: What rule
does that clause establish? The Court in Foster concluded that the
clause establishes that a treaty that purports to act directly on the
subject alters the rights and obligations addressed in the treaty,
whereas a treaty that is framed as an obligation to “pass acts”
accomplishing certain goals does not alter individual rights or
obligations of its own force. Such a rule does not turn on the
“intent” of the U.S. treatymakers on the question of judicial
enforceability or on whether implementing legislation is required.
With respect to treaties that purport to act directly on the subject,

108. See id. at 614.
109. I elaborate this critique of the Restatement (Third)’s reasoning on this point in Four
Doctrines, supra note 4, at 707–08. See also Judicial Enforcement, supra note 4, at 638–41.
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the Supremacy Clause itself dispenses with the need for
implementing legislation.
In theory, our constitutional rule could have been that a treaty’s
enforceability in the courts is determined by the intent of the U.S.
treatymakers on that question. I have discussed at length elsewhere,
and will not repeat here, why such a rule is difficult to square with
the text of the Supremacy Clause as well as the case law. 110 The
remainder of this Part addresses the support provided in the draft
Restatement (Fourth) for concluding that this is the rule that our
Constitution establishes. The main support provided are: (a) the
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Medellín v. Texas, discussed in
Subsection 1, and (b) the assumed validity of declarations of nonself-execution, discussed in Subsection 2.
1. Medellín v. Texas on whose intent matters
In support of its view that self-execution turns on the intent
or understanding of U.S. treatymakers concerning the domestic
enforceability of the treaty, the reporters rely heavily on the
Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Medellín v. Texas. But the
statements that the draft quotes in this regard do not support the
claim that the issue turns on the intent of the U.S. treatymakers
regarding the treaty’s judicial enforceability. In one of the quoted
statements, the Court says instead that “we have held treaties to
be self-executing when the textual provisions indicate that the
President and Senate intended for the agreement to have domestic
effect.” 111 In the other, the Court stated that a treaty is selfexecuting when its “terms reflect a determination by the President
who negotiated it and the Senate that confirmed it that the treaty
has domestic effect.” 112 Rather than focusing on the U.S.
treatymakers’ intent regarding judicial enforceability, these
statements refer to the intent or understanding of the U.S.
treatymakers regarding whether the treaty has domestic legal
110. See generally Judicial Enforcement, supra note 4; Four Doctrines, supra note 4.
111. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 519 (2008), quoted in RESTATEMENT (FOURTH)
OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES: TREATIES § 106 cmt. d (AM. LAW
INST., April Discussion Draft 2015).
112. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 521, quoted in RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES: TREATIES § 106 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST., April
Discussion Draft 2015).
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force. As noted above, this reflects the majority’s stated view that
a non-self-executing treaty lacks the force of domestic law. 113 The
reporters rightly reject this understanding of the nature of intentbased non-self-execution. The draft claims that Medellín itself is
ambiguous on the question, 114 but the statements quoted in this
paragraph, and others—including in footnote 2, where the
majority directly explains what it means by “self-execution”—
appear to state its view clearly. The reporters are nonetheless right
to reject this understanding as incompatible with the text of the
Supremacy Clause.
Despite their rejection of what Medellín has to say about the
nature of the self-execution question, and hence what sort of intent
is relevant, the reporters lean heavily on the Medellín majority’s
suggestion that it is the intent of the U.S. treatymakers that matters.
It is true that the Court in Medellín refers repeatedly to how the
U.S. treatymakers must have understood the treaty. But this does not
mean that the Court in Medellín regarded the intent of the U.S.
treatymakers as controlling in the way the draft Restatement (Fourth)
seems to contemplate. Each time the Court refers to the presumed
understanding of the U.S. treatymakers, it refers to their intent as
reflected in the text of the treaty, or, in one case, the treaty’s “text,
background, negotiating and drafting history, or practice among
signatory nations.” 115 Given its focus on the treaty’s text, it is likely
that the Court viewed the understanding of the U.S. treatymakers as
relevant to interpreting the treaty. This conclusion is buttressed by
the Court’s clear understanding of the self-execution issue as one of
treaty interpretation. 116 As discussed above, treaty interpretation
turns on the joint intent of the parties; the intent of the U.S.
treatymakers is relevant, but it is not conclusive. The majority’s many
references in Medellín to the presumed intent of the U.S.
treatymakers may reflect the view that, for U.S. courts, the intent of
the U.S. treatymakers deserves more weight in treaty interpretation
than the views of other parties. But it does not necessarily support
113. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
114. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES: TREATIES § 106 reporters’ note 6 (AM. LAW INST., April Discussion Draft 2015).
115. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 523.
116. Id. at 506 (“The interpretation of a treaty, like the interpretation of a statute,
begins with its text.”).
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the claim that the intent of the U.S. treatymakers determines the
self-execution question.
Indeed, the Medellín opinion suggests that giving conclusive
effect to the intent of the U.S. treatymakers in the manner the draft
contemplates would raise significant constitutional difficulties. As
discussed above, treaties rarely address matters of domestic
implementation, including the question of direct judicial
enforceability. 117 Consequently, treaties will rarely address the issue
that the reporters regard as the “essence” of self-execution. The
current draft does not dispute this point. To the contrary, it asserts
that “[o]nly rarely will a treaty be regarded as addressing methods
of domestic implementation for the United States.” 118 And, even
when treaties do address that question, according to the current
draft, any such provisions are not controlling, but are mere
evidence of the intent of the U.S. treatymakers, which is
controlling. 119 As explained above, the current draft concludes that
the U.S. treatymakers have the power to determine the domestic
judicial enforceability of the treaties they conclude. 120 The view
reflected in the current draft is thus that the intent of the U.S.
treatymakers controls direct judicial enforceability even when such
intent does not bear upon the meaning of the treaty itself on this
question. We might call this the disembodied intent of the U.S.
treatymakers, since in most cases it is completely unconnected to
what the treaty itself has to say on the question of judicial
enforceability. In the vast majority of cases, the treaty will have
nothing to say (either explicitly or implicitly) on that question. 121
The Court’s analysis in the final section of the Medellín opinion
strongly suggests that it would reject the draft’s claim that the
disembodied intent of the U.S. treatymakers controls. In this final
section, the Court considered the validity of the President’s
“memorandum” instructing states to comply with the International
Court of Justice’s (ICJ) judgment in Avena by providing the hearing
117. See supra note 107 and text accompanying.
118. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES: TREATIES § 106 reporters’ note 2 (AM. LAW INST., April Discussion Draft 2015).
119. See supra text accompanying notes 99–100.
120. See supra text accompanying note 104.
121. See supra text accompanying notes 107–109. The reporters appear to agree. See
supra text accompanying note 118.
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required by the judgment. 122 Having concluded that Article 94 of
the U.N. Charter was non-self-executing, and hence that the ICJ
judgment was not directly enforceable in the courts, the Court
considered whether the President had the power to require
compliance with the judgment. 123 In concluding that he did not, the
Court employed a highly formalistic analysis: preemptive federal law
must take the form of, or be authorized by, either a treaty or a statute.124
The President’s memorandum does not qualify as either of those. 125 The
Court’s analysis in this section was reminiscent of the equally formalist
analysis in I.N.S. v. Chadha,126 in which the Court struck down the
legislative veto because it was the act of one or both houses of
Congress, which does not have the power to legislate without the
involvement of the President (unless his veto is overridden).
This sort of analysis would appear to pose significant problems
for the claim that the U.S. treatymakers (the President and Senate)
control the domestic judicial enforceability of treaties. Treaties are,
of course, one of the three categories of supreme federal law, but
treaties are not made by the President and the Senate alone. Treaties
are agreements between the United States (acting through the
President and Senate) and another country. When the treaty itself
does not address this question of direct judicial enforceability either
explicitly or implicitly (which will almost always be the case), 127 the
intent of the U.S. treatymakers on this question cannot be said to be
part of the treaty or even relevant to its interpretation. And, of
course, the intent of the U.S. treatymakers regarding the direct
judicial enforceability of a treaty is not a federal statute. It is thus at
least doubtful that the Court that decided Medellín would give
binding force to such a free-floating “intent” of the U.S.
treatymakers. Only the treaty is domestic law, and the treaty is by
definition the agreement of the parties; the unilateral intent of the
U.S. treatymakers on an issue the treaty itself does not address is
neither law nor relevant to interpreting a law.

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
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As noted, the Court in Medellín regarded the issue before it to
be one of treaty interpretation. 128 It was in that context that it gave
weight to the intent of the U.S. treatymakers. The fact that it always
referred to the intent of the U.S. treatymakers in conjunction with
the treaty’s text suggests that it viewed the intent of the U.S.
treatymakers to be relevant in determining the meaning of the treaty.
It is one thing to regard the views of the U.S. treatymakers as
relevant to the meaning of the treaty. It is quite another, and highly
problematic from the perspective of cases like Chadha and Medellín
itself, to give binding force to the intent of the U.S. treatymakers on
a question that the treaty itself concededly does not address.
Medellín is best interpreted as having held that Article 94, by
which the United States “under[took] to comply” 129 with the
judgments of the ICJ, imposes an obligation on parties to use their
best efforts to comply with the judgments of the ICJ. Although this
is contrary to the usual understanding of the term “undertakes” in
international law, 130 it is supported by a secondary, colloquial
meaning of the term “to undertake” as a synonym for “to
endeavor.” 131 Moreover, the Court relied on the fact that the treaty
did not say that the parties “shall” or “must” comply with the
judgments of the ICJ. 132 This indicates that the Court understood
the term “undertakes” to mean something other than “shall” or
“must,” and thus that Article 94 left some discretion for noncompliance. Finally, this interpretation is consistent with the Court’s
apparent understanding of the issue before it as one of treaty
128. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
129. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 508.
130. See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide (Bosn. v. Serb.), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 188, ¶ 162 (Feb. 26) (“The ordinary
meaning of the word ‘undertake’ is to give a formal promise, to bind or engage oneself, to give
a pledge or promise, to agree, to accept an obligation. It is a word regularly used in treaties
setting out the obligation of the Contracting parties. . . . It is not merely hortatory or
purposive. The undertaking is unqualified . . . .”). That the term “undertakes” denotes an
immediate, unqualified obligation was not briefed to the Court in Medellín because none of
the briefs supporting Texas put forward the interpretation of the term apparently adopted by
the majority. The idea that the term “undertakes” suggests an attenuated, qualified obligation
made its first appearance in the case in a question asked at oral argument by Justice Alito. Oral
Argument at 8:26, Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008) (No. 06-984),
http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2007/2007_06_984.
131. See Judicial Enforcement, supra note 4, at 661–62.
132. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 508.
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interpretation. Concededly, other statements in the opinion appear
to suggest that the Court read Article 94 to impose an obligation to
comply with ICJ judgments. 133 But that reading of Article 94
conflicts with the Court’s reliance on the fact that Article 94 does
not say “shall” or “must,” as well as with the statement that the
United States retained the “option” of “[n]oncompliance.” 134 Given
the conflicting indications of the Court’s reasoning, the
interpretation that does the least violence to the constitutional text
and precedents such as Foster should be preferred. If the Court did
hold that Article 94 imposed an obligation to use best efforts to
comply with ICJ judgments, then its conclusion that Article 94 was
non-self-executing was correct, as the Article would have required a
judgment of a non-judicial nature. 135
Alternatively, the Court might be understood to have held that
Article 94 establishes a nondiscretionary duty to “pass acts”
requiring compliance with the judgments of the ICJ. This
interpretation is supported by the majority’s statement that it agreed
with the executive branch’s argument that “the phrase ‘undertakes
to comply’ is . . . a commitment on the part of U.N. Members to
take future action through their political branches to comply with an
ICJ decision.” 136 It is buttressed by the Court’s citation and
quotation, as support for its agreement with the executive branch’s
interpretation of the treaty, of Foster’s holding that the treaty in that

133. See id. at 504 (noting that Avena “constitutes an international law obligation on
the part of the United States”) (emphasis omitted). But see Judicial Enforcement, supra note 4,
at 662 (noting that these statements might be read to say that the United States had an
international law obligation to use best efforts to comply).
134. See Medellín, 552 U.S. at 510.
135. As indicated in Part II, the conclusion that a treaty is non-self-executing because it
is nonjusticiable turns on constitutional considerations, not on the intent of the U.S.
treatymakers or of the parties. Nevertheless, it requires a prior interpretation of the treaty to
determine the international obligation imposed by the treaty. The intent of the treaty parties,
including of the U.S. treatymakers, is relevant to determining the nature of the international
obligation. If Medellín is understood as I have suggested, the Court relied on the intent of the
U.S. treatymakers as evidence of the treaty’s meaning—that is, in determining that the treaty
imposed an obligation to use best efforts to comply with ICJ judgments. If the treaty did
impose such an obligation, its judicial unenforceability derives from a constitutional disability
of courts, not on any intent of the U.S treatymakers regarding direct judicial enforceability.
136. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 508 (quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae, Medellín v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660 (2005) (per curiam) (No. 04-5928), at *34
(emphasis in original)).
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case “pledge[d] the faith of the United States to pass acts.” 137 It is
hard to see how the treaty’s language actually supports such a
reading, but whether this interpretation of Article 94 is correct is less
important for present purposes than the fact that this is what the
Court understood itself to be holding. The Court (a) clearly viewed
the issue as one of treaty interpretation, 138 (b) viewed its holding as
merely an application of the Foster principle that a treaty is non-selfexecuting if it “pledge[s] the faith of the United States to pass
acts,” 139 and (c) agreed with the executive branch that the need for
implementing legislation derived from the nature of the international
obligation established by the treaty as it applies to all “U.N.
Members.” 140 So understood, Medellín confirms that the selfexecution issue turns on whether the international obligation
established by the treaty is one that “acts directly on the subject” or
is instead an obligation to pass legislation accomplishing certain
specified aims. The intent of the U.S. treatymakers is important
evidence of the meaning of the obligation imposed by the treaty,
entitled to deference in the U.S. courts, but it is not itself what
controls the self-executing character of the treaty.
In the face of these well-supported alternative interpretations of
the Court’s opinion, Medellín provides at best only highly
ambiguous support for the claim that the intent of the treatymakers
concerning judicial enforceability determines whether a treaty is
judicially enforceable, even when the treaty itself does not purport to
address that issue.
2. Declarations of non-self-execution (and of self-execution)
In support of its claim that self-execution turns on the intent of
the treatymakers regarding judicial enforceability, the draft
Restatement (Fourth) also relies on the United States’ recent
practice of attaching declarations of non-self-execution to some
treaties. The draft asserts that the treaties to which these
declarations have been attached have included provisions that, in
the absence of the declaration, would appear to be self-executing
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. (quoting Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314–15 (1829)).
See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
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because they are “specific, are mandatory, and concern individual
rights.” 141 The draft notes that the courts “have generally treated
Senate declarations of non-self-execution as authoritative.” 142 If
these declarations are valid and effectively transform an otherwise
self-executing treaty into a non-self-executing treaty, the draft
Restatement (Fourth) reasons, they reflect the constitutional power
of the U.S. treatymakers to control the domestic judicial
enforceability of the treaties they conclude. 143
The draft Restatement (Fourth) is undoubtedly correct in
noting that the treaties to which these declarations have been
attached include provisions that would otherwise be self-executing
and judicially enforceable. For example, the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which was “declared” nonself-executing, includes a provision prohibiting the execution of
pregnant women. 144 In the absence of the declaration of non-selfexecution attached to the ICCPR, this provision would certainly be
self-executing. 145 It purports to “act directly on” the subject,

141. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES: TREATIES § 106 reporters’ note 4 (AM. LAW INST., April Discussion Draft 2015).
142. Id. (citing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 735 (2004); Renkel v. United
States, 456 F.3d 640, 644 (6th Cir. 2006).
143. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
144. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6(5), Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
145. The only possible basis for a contrary conclusion would be based on the fact that
article 2(1) of the ICCPR provides that, “[e]ach State Party to the present Covenant
undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its
jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant,” and Article 2(2) provides that
“[w]here not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each State Party to
the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance with its
constitutional processes and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to adopt such laws or
other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the present
Covenant.” Id. If a court were to interpret the term “undertakes” in the way the Supreme
Court did in Medellín, it could conclude that Article 2(1) renders the entire treaty non-selfexecuting. See supra text accompanying notes 130–135. However, for the reasons discussed
above, this would be a misinterpretation of that term. See supra note 130. Article 2(2) should
not be read as an indication that the entire ICCPR is an obligation to “pass acts” protecting
the rights set forth in the Convention. The article requires legislation only where “necessary.”
With respect to provisions that “act upon the subject,” such as the one barring the execution
of pregnant women, legislation is not necessary in the United States (although it would be
necessary in the United Kingdom). See generally Four Doctrines, supra note 4, at 709 & n.64.
The reporters appear to agree that Article 2(2) does not render the ICCPR non-self-executing.
See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES:

1784

9.VAZQUEZ.FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

1747

5/6/2016 8:02 AM

Draft Restatement’s Treatment of Treaty Self-Execution

prohibiting certain specific acts. Any pregnant woman threatened
with execution would have standing to challenge the execution on
the basis of the ICCPR, and, in the absence of the declaration of
non-self-execution, a court with jurisdiction would be obligated to
enjoin the execution on the basis of the treaty. 146 If that provision is
non-self-executing, therefore, it is solely because of the declaration
of non-self-execution.
It is also true that these declarations have been assumed by the
Supreme Court to be valid and effective. The Court has not offered
much analysis to support this view, however. Sosa v. AlvarezMachain, the only Supreme Court opinion to address the issue,
merely stated in conclusory fashion in dicta that “the United States
ratified [the ICCPR] on the express understanding that it was not
self-executing and so did not itself create obligations enforceable in
the federal courts.” 147 This case is weak support for the validity of
the declarations.
Scholars have argued that these declarations are not valid, 148 and
their arguments cannot be easily dismissed. As noted above, most
treaties do not address the issue of domestic implementation. 149 They
do not address whether the treaty directly alters the legal rights and
obligations of individuals or instead requires legislative
implementation. That certainly is true of the ICCPR, the treaty
mentioned in Sosa. The Covenant leaves it to the domestic laws of
the States’ parties to determine whether its provisions directly alter
domestic legal rights and duties or instead are subject to legislative
implementation. 150 Our domestic law is the Supremacy Clause,
which, as interpreted in Foster, establishes that provisions that “act

TREATIES § 106 reporters’ note 2 (AM. LAW INST., April Discussion Draft 2015) (noting that
“general provisions in a treaty directing states parties to adopt necessary legislative measures
under domestic law do not resolve the issue of self-execution under U.S. law, since in the U.S.
domestic system, legislation is not necessarily required”).
146. See generally Judicial Enforcement, supra note 4, at 611–13.
147. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 735.
148. A list of these sources is provided in Four Doctrines, supra note 4, at 708 n.61. See
also Ramsey, supra note 40.
149. See supra notes 107–109 and text accompanying.
150. See U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment 31: The Nature of the General
Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, ¶ 13, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev. 1/Add. 13 (Mar. 29, 2004) (“Article 2 . . . does not require that the
[ICCPR] be directly applicable in the courts[.]”).
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directly on” the subject do alter domestic-law rights and duties of
their own force. 151 The question is whether the declaration of nonself-execution, which purports to alter that conclusion, is valid. The
analysis sketched above with respect to the disembodied intent of the
U.S. treatymakers is equally applicable here. 152 Since the declaration
is obviously not a federal statute or part of the Constitution itself, a
formalist would ask whether the declaration is part of the treaty. A
treaty, however, consists of the agreement between the United States
and the other States-parties. Because the treaty itself by hypothesis
does not address, either explicitly or implicitly, the question of
domestic implementation (including the question of direct judicial
enforceability), the declaration of non-self-execution would appear
to be merely a unilateral statement of the United States purporting
to alter the ordinary domestic law effect of the treaty. As such, it
would appear not to be part of the treaty itself. It would appear to be
no more effective than the President’s unilateral attempt in Medellín
to implement the non-self-executing treaty involved in that case. 153
Most of the arguments that have been raised by defenders of
the validity of these declarations are unpersuasive. One of the
reporters has defended the validity of these declarations by analogy
to the power lawmakers have to control the domestic legal effects
of the statutes they enact, for example, by specifying that the
statute will not preempt state law or will not create a private right
of action. 154 Echoing that argument, Reporters’ Note 6 relies on
the same analogy in attempting to reconcile the non-self-execution
doctrine with the Supremacy Clause. 155 But the analogy is inapt. In
the case of statutes, the limitation of the legal effects of the statute
comes from the statute itself. In the case of the declaration of nonself-execution, as we have seen, the limitation would appear not to
be a part of the treaty. The declaration reflects the views of the U.S.
treatymakers, but the U.S. treatymakers do not make treaties by

151. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829).
152. See supra text accompanying notes 117–128.
153. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 525–29 (2008).
154. See Curtis A. Bradley, The Juvenile Death Penalty and International Law, 52 DUKE
L.J. 485, 545–46 (2002); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights,
and Conditional Consent, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 399, 447–48 (2000).
155. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES: TREATIES § 106 reporters’ note 6 (AM. LAW INST., April Discussion Draft 2015).

1786

9.VAZQUEZ.FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

1747

5/6/2016 8:02 AM

Draft Restatement’s Treatment of Treaty Self-Execution

themselves. They make treaties by entering into agreements with
other states. In the case of these treaties (as with virtually all
treaties), the agreement with the other states did not include any
agreement on the question of domestic implementation addressed
by the declaration. The parties left that question to the domestic
law of each state. 156 And a declaration of non-self-execution is not a
domestic law of the United States.
There is one persuasive basis for concluding that declarations of
non-self-execution are valid and effective, but this argument does
not support the draft Restatement (Fourth)’s broader argument that
the self-execution question turns more generally on the unilateral
intent of the U.S. treatymakers on the question of judicial
enforceability. 157 The argument is based on the fact that a
hypothetical reservation of non-self-execution would be valid (or at
least effective). A reservation differs from a declaration in that it does
purport to alter the mutual rights and obligations of the parties. 158 A
statement of non-self-execution would thus be a reservation as
opposed to a declaration if the statement were attached to a treaty
that did purport to require that its provisions be treated as directly
applicable law in the state’s legal system. Such treaties are rare, but
can in theory exist. 159 Thus, the same statement of non-self-execution
that the United States has attached to the ICCPR and other treaties
would constitute a reservation if the treaty required that its
provisions be treated as self-executing. Because such a statement
would purport to alter the mutual rights and obligations of the
states-parties, it would clearly be a part of the treaty to which it is
attached for purposes of Article II, and hence Article VI.
156. For an explanation of why other defenses of these declarations are unpersuasive, see
Judicial Enforcement, supra note 4, at 675–77.
157. I elaborate this argument in some detail elsewhere. See Judicial Enforcement, supra
note 4, at 667–85. I shall only sketch its broad outlines here.
158. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 87, art. 2(1)(d)
(defining reservation as “a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a State,
when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to
exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to
that State”).
159. See, e.g., Bacardi Corp. of Am. v. Domenech, 311 U.S. 150, 159–62 n.9 (1940)
(noting the self-executing character of the General Inter-American Convention for Trade 28
Mark and Commercial Protection, which stipulated in part that its provisions “shall have the
force of law in those States in which international treaties possess that character, as soon as they
are ratified by their constitutional organs”).
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Under prevailing rules of customary international law, such a
reservation would effectively preclude direct application of its
provisions by judicial and executive officials. Ordinarily, the effect
under international law of ratifying a treaty subject to such a
reservation is to bind the reserving party to the treaty subject to the
reservation. 160 If another state-party objects to the reservation, but
does not object to the entry into force of the treaty with respect to
the reserving state, the reserving state and the objecting state
become parties to the treaty, except that the provision to which the
reservation relates is not in force to the extent of the reservation. 161 If
the objecting state objects to the entry into force of the treaty
between it and the reserving state, the treaty does not come into
force as between those states. 162 In all three cases, the treaty will not
be directly applicable by executive or judicial officials in the United
States—in the first two cases because the reservation deprives it of
any such effect, and in the third case because the United States is not
a party to the treaty vis-à-vis the objecting state. 163 The reservation
will thus be valid (in the first two cases) or at least effective (in the
third case).
A declaration of non-self-execution differs from a reservation of
non-self-execution in that it is attached to a treaty that neither
requires nor forbids that its provisions be directly applied as law in
the states-parties’ domestic legal systems. 164 That is, indeed, the
feature of such statements that calls into question their status as
part of the treaty for purposes of the Supremacy Clause: they do
not purport to affect the international rights and obligations of the
parties, but are mere unilateral statements regarding which of the
mechanisms permitted by the treaty for carrying out the treaty’s
obligations the United States will employ. Nevertheless, the validity
of a declaration of non-self-execution seems to follow from the

160. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 87, at art. 21(1).
161. See id. art. 21(3).
162. See id. art. 20(4)(b).
163. A reservation is also invalid if it is contrary to the object and purpose of the treaty
to which it is attached. For the reasons explained in Judicial Enforcement, supra note 4, at
679–80, it is almost certain that a reservation of non-self-execution will not be contrary to the
object or purpose of the treaty to which it is attached.
164. As discussed above, treaties rarely address the details of domestic enforcement. See
supra text accompanying notes 107–109.

1788

9.VAZQUEZ.FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

1747

5/6/2016 8:02 AM

Draft Restatement’s Treatment of Treaty Self-Execution

conclusion that a reservation of non-self-execution would be valid
(or at least effective). The difference between a reservation and a
declaration of non-self-execution is that the former is attached to a
treaty that otherwise requires direct application, while the latter is
attached to a treaty that permits but does not require direct
application. If the statement of non-self-execution is valid (or at
least effective) when it goes against the desires of the other statesparties, then it seems absurd to conclude that the statement is
invalid when—indeed, because—the other parties did not mean to
require otherwise. 165
The validity of a hypothetical reservation of non-self-execution
thus suggests that the actual declarations of non-self-execution are
valid and effective. If so, the response to the formalist objection to
the validity of these declarations would be that these declarations
are parts of the treaties to which they are attached, despite the fact
that they do not purport to alter any of the United States’
international obligations under the treaty. A functionalist defense of
the validity of the declarations might note that, under Foster, a
similar statement inserted into the text of the treaty would be
effective, even if the other parties to the treaty did not care about
the issue. If the validity of a statement in the text doesn’t turn on
whether the other parties would otherwise have wanted the treaty’s
provisions to be directly applicable as law in the United States, then
the validity of a statement submitted with the instruments of
ratification should also not turn on whether the statement
contradicts the other parties’ desires.
But it does not follow from the validity of declarations of nonself-execution that the self-execution question turns more generally
on the intent of the U.S. treatymakers on the question of domestic
judicial enforceability, as the draft suggests. The case for the validity
of these declarations rests on the validity of reservations of non-selfexecution, which leads to the conclusion that the declarations are as
much a part of the treaties, for purposes of Article VI, as reservations
of non-self-execution are. But it is quite another matter to say that,
in the absence of such formal declarations, the free-floating “intent”
of the U.S. treatymakers governs whether the treaty’s provisions are
directly applicable as law by executive and judicial officials. For the
165.

For elaboration of these absurdities, see Judicial Enforcement, supra note 4, at 682–83.
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reasons noted, these declarations are acts of law-making. They
transform treaty provisions that “act upon the subject” into
provisions requiring the United States to “pass acts” accomplishing
the treaty goals. Thus, the declaration attached to the ICCPR
transforms the provision that reads “[the] [s]entence of death . . .
shall not be carried out on pregnant women” 166 into one that
provides “the United States shall pass legislation prohibiting the
execution of pregnant women.” It is one thing to say that this act of
lawmaking can be accomplished through a formal declaration
deposited with the treaty’s instruments of ratification; it is quite
another to say that such lawmaking can be accomplished through
less formal acts, such as statements in executive or Senate reports or
statements by the executive officials at Senate hearings. 167
An intermediate case would be a declaration of non-selfexecution included with the Senate’s resolution of advice and
consent, but not deposited with United States’ instruments of
ratification or otherwise formally communicated to the other
parties. 168 Consistent with its view that the unilateral intent of the
U.S. treatymakers controls the self-execution question, the draft
Restatement (Fourth) concludes that such declarations are binding.169
It is uncertain whether the declarations would be regarded as a part
of the treaties from the formalist perspective reflected in the final
section of Medellín. To treat such declarations as effective at
166. ICCPR, supra note 105, at art. 6(5).
167. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES: TREATIES § 106 reporters’ note 4 (AM. LAW INST., April Discussion Draft 2015),
indicates that, “[b]ecause these statements are not voted on by the Senate as a whole and do
not formally condition its advice and consent to the treaty, there is less basis for treating them
as authoritative.” Reporters’ Note 4 goes on to point out, however, that “[t]hey nevertheless
may be taken into account as indicia of the views of the U.S. treatymakers.” Given the draft
Restatement (Fourth)’s position that self-execution turns on the intent of the U.S.
treatymakers, it would appear that the reporters’ hesitation in treating these less formal
statements as authoritative derives solely from possible doubts about whether such statements
truly reflect the view of two-thirds of the Senate.
168. Although the declarations of non-self-execution attached to the ICCPR and other
human rights treaties were deposited with the instruments of ratification, more recent
declarations have not been. See Judicial Enforcement, supra note 4, at 670, n.318.
169. Indeed, the draft Restatement (Fourth) refers to declarations of non-self-execution
as being included in the Senate’s resolution of advice and consent without mentioning that
they are also deposited with the instruments of ratification. See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES: TREATIES § 106(2) cmt. f (AM. LAW
INST., April Discussion Draft 2015); id. § 106 reporters’ note 4.
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transforming a self-executing treaty into a non-self-executing one,
even when the declarations are not deposited with the instruments of
ratification and thus could not plausibly be regarded as a part of the
treaty, would appear to require the recognition of a new category of
supreme federal law.
In recent years, the treatymakers have been attaching
declarations of self-execution to some treaties. 170 Whether such
declarations are effective at transforming non-self-executing treaties
into self-executing ones presents a harder question than whether
declarations of non-self-execution are effective at transforming selfexecuting treaties into non-self-executing ones. The draft
Restatement (Fourth)’s position that self-execution turns on the
intent of the U.S. treatymakers would appear to lead to the
conclusion that declarations of self-execution are equally valid. But,
because these declarations purport to enhance rather than to limit
the domestic legal effect of the relevant treaties, the formalist
objection to these reservations seems stronger. The argument based
on the validity of reservations of non-self-execution does not apply
to declarations of self-execution. 171 The Draft Restatement
acknowledges that such declarations present more significant
problems than declarations of non-self-execution and concludes that
it is likely that the courts will give them “substantial weight,” 172
suggesting that it does not regard them as binding. 173
Even if one regards such declarations as valid and effective at
transforming a self-executing treaty into a non-self-executing treaty,
and vice versa, such a conclusion does not establish that the intent of
the treatymakers governs the self-execution in the absence of such
declarations. To the extent the treatymakers continue the practice of
expressing their intent through such declarations, the question of the
relevance of their disembodied intent should become less significant
170. See Judicial Enforcement, supra note 4, at 670 n.318.
171. For elaboration, see Judicial Enforcement, supra note 4, at 685–88.
172. See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES: TREATIES § 106 reporters’ note 4 (AM. LAW INST., April Discussion Draft 2015).
173. If declarations of self-execution are valid and effective at transforming non-selfexecuting treaties into self-executing ones, even when not deposited with the instruments of
ratification, then the question arises whether the treatymakers have the power through such
declarations to make law relating to the domestic enforcement of treaties in other respects.
Many such declarations, for example, create private rights of action for damages for violation of
the treaties’ provisions, establish statutes of limitations, or waive sovereign immunity?
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over time. Nevertheless, many important treaties were concluded
before the treatymakers developed this practice, so it remains
important to understand how to determine the self-executing status
of a treaty in the absence of such declarations. The draft should
clarify that self-execution turns on the intent of the U.S.
treatymakers only when that intent is reflected in a declaration of
non-self-execution (or possibly also when reflected in a declaration of
self-execution). 174 In other cases, the issue turns on whether the
treaty, as written, “acts directly on” the subject or instead imposes an
obligation to “pass acts” accomplishing the treaty’s aims.
IV. THE PRESUMPTION OF SELF-EXECUTION
The draft Restatement (Fourth) takes the position that “the case
law has not established a presumption for or against self-execution,
in the sense of a clear statement or default rule that dictates a result
in the absence of contrary evidence.” 175 It is true that the case law
does not establish a presumption for or against self-execution with
respect to the “constitutionality” category of non-self-execution,
implicitly recognized by the draft Restatement (Fourth) as a distinct
category. It is also true that there is no presumption for or against
self-execution with respect to the justiciability category, which I have
defended above as another distinct category. 176 But as this Part will
show, there is substantial support for a presumption that treaties are
self-executing in the intent-based sense recognized in Foster. Such a
presumption is supported by the text of the Supremacy Clause in
light of the Court’s understanding of the nature of the self-execution
question in Foster. In addition, the Court’s analysis in Percheman,
belatedly recognizing that the treaty held to be non-self-executing in
Foster was actually self-executing, is best read as establishing such a
presumption. As the current draft itself recognizes, the Supreme

174. Even if there is a declaration of non-self-execution, there may be an issue about the
meaning of the declaration. As the draft notes, the declaration of non-self-execution attached
to the ICCPR was apparently intended to clarify that the Covenant would not create a private
right of action. See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES: TREATIES § 106 reporters’ note 4 (AM. LAW INST., April Discussion
Draft 2015).
175. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES: TREATIES § 106 reporters’ note 3 (AM. LAW INST., April Discussion Draft 2015).
176. See supra Section I.B.
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Court’s practice in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries can
be read to “reflect[] a presumption in favor of judicial
enforcement.” 177 Finally, although Medellín has language that seems
to apply a presumption against self-execution, parts of the Court’s
analysis also support a presumption in favor of self-execution.
Since the presumption defended here applies only to the intentbased category of non-self-execution, the analysis that follows
assumes that the treaty obligation is neither vague nor aspirational,
nor framed in a way that calls for policy judgments of a nonjudicial
nature. Since the reporters have stipulated that remedial issues are
separate, 178 I also assume that the treaty is being invoked by someone
with standing who possesses a right of action. The question is thus
whether a clear and specific treaty provision of this sort should
nevertheless be considered non-self-executing because of the intent
of the parties or of the U.S. treatymakers. Because the Supremacy
Clause altered the British rule, under which all treaties required
implementing legislation, by giving “all” treaties the force of
supreme federal law and instructing courts to give them effect,
finding such treaties to be non-self-executing would appear to
require some affirmative reason for believing that the parties or the
treatymakers intended to require implementing legislation. If so, the
clause establishes a presumption, or at least a default rule, that a
treaty is self-executing (in the intent-based sense).
As discussed above, the Court in Foster understood the issue to
be whether the treaty, as framed, acts directly on the subject or
instead commits the nation to pass acts accomplishing certain aims.179
In answering that question with respect to the treaty before it, the
Court in Foster concededly did not apply a presumption favoring the
former reading. But the dangers of this approach were soon made
evident to the Court. When faced with the Spanish text of the treaty

177. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES: TREATIES § 106 reporters’ note 3 (AM. LAW INST., April Discussion Draft 2015). The
reporters’ note refers to “courts” rather than the Supreme Court specifically. But the practice
of the courts that leads the reporters to conclude that these cases might reflect a presumption
of self-execution is the practice of “often enforc[ing] treaties without discussing the question
of self-execution.” Id. As the draft Restatement (Fourth) explains in Reporters’ Note 1, this
was the practice of the Supreme Court as well as the lower courts.
178. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
179. See supra Part II.
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in Percheman, the Court reversed itself and held the treaty to be selfexecuting. 180 But the Court in Percheman did not just rely on the
clarity of the Spanish text. The Spanish text led the Court to realize
that the English wording on which it had so confidently relied in
Foster was actually ambiguous and could have been used to convey
the same meaning as the Spanish text. 181 The closest the Court came
to articulating a test for non-self-execution was its statement, in
finding the clause to be self-executing, that the provision did not
necessarily “stipulat[e] for [a] future legislative act.” 182 Percheman
thus supports the conclusion that a treaty is self-executing unless it
“stipulate[es] for [a] future legislative act.” This formulation
suggests the need for clarity of language to support a determination
that a treaty was meant to require implementing legislation. 183
Percheman’s cautious approach is justified by the fact that states
have different domestic constitutional rules regarding domestic
implementation of treaties. As noted, the Court in Foster recognized
that treaties in other countries generally do not effectuate their
objects of their own force, but that the Supremacy Clause establishes
a different principle for the United States. 184 Indeed, at the time of
the Constitution’s adoption, the United States was one of only a few
countries (possibly the only country) not to require legislative
implementation of treaties. 185 It is because of the diversity of
constitutional approaches to domestic implementation of treaties
that treaties rarely address the question of domestic implementation.
This, in turn, means that treaty language will rarely have been
selected to convey some meaning on the question whether the treaty
“acts directly on” the subject or instead pledges the nation’s faith to
“pass acts” accomplishing its ultimate aims. Reading ambiguous
language as establishing the latter obligation risks attributing to the
parties a nonexistent intent.

180. United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 89 (1833).
181. Id. at 88–89.
182. Id. at 89.
183. See generally Judicial Enforcement, supra note 4, at 644–45.
184. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829).
185. See Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 277 (1796) (Iredell, J., dissenting)
(noting that the U.S. Constitution “affords the first instance of any government . . . saying,
treaties should be the supreme law of the land”).
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Percheman’s recognition of the likely ambiguity of treaty
language on this question came in a case involving a bilateral
treaty. 186 The need for a presumption is even greater for multilateral
treaties. It is even less plausible with respect to a multilateral treaty
than a bilateral treaty to think that the language was chosen with a
view to addressing the issue posed in Foster. Multilateral treaties
involve many potential parties with widely varying constitutional
rules regarding domestic implementation. Because the same
language will be equally applicable to all such countries, it is highly
unlikely that the language chosen was designed to address the issue
the Court posed in Foster. A presumption that the treaty was not
intended to require implementing legislation has the benefit of
according with the reality that the parties will not have intended
anything regarding the need for legislative implementation. Thus, a
presumption of self-execution is particularly important for
multilateral treaties.
The case-law support for a presumption of self-execution
includes not just Percheman’s “stipulation” language, but also the
overall thrust of the cases in the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. The draft itself recognizes that the Court’s approach
during this period “might have reflected a presumption in favor of
judicial enforcement.” 187 As already noted, after Foster, with one
possible exception, the Court did not hold a treaty to be non-selfexecuting again until its recent decision in Medellín. 188
There is language in Medellín that suggests the Court was
applying a presumption against self-execution. 189 Certainly, a finding
of non-self-execution based on the treaty’s use of the term
“undertakes” is difficult to square with a presumption of selfexecution. But the Court did not just rely on that treaty text. It also
relied on the United States’ retention of the veto and even on the

186. Carlos M. Vázquez, Foster v. Neilson and United States v. Percheman: Judicial
Enforcement of Treaties, in INTERNATIONAL LAW STORIES 151–74 (John E. Noyes et al.
eds., 2007).
187. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
188. See supra note 4; Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 518–19 (2008).
189. See, e.g., Medellín, 552 U.S. at 526 (describing a non-self-executing treaty as “a
treaty . . . ratified without provisions clearly according it domestic effect”).
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fact that Mr. Medellín was not a party to the ICJ judgment. 190 The
holding rests on all of those factors combined, not on any one of
them. Indeed, some parts of the Court’s analysis are consistent only
with a presumption in favor of self-execution. In particular, the
Court found that the existence of a non-self-executing treaty placed
the President’s memorandum in the third Youngstown category.191
That would be so, however, only if a finding of non-self-execution
rests on affirmative evidence that the parties (or the treatymakers)
intended to require legislation. If non-self-execution could be based
on mere silence about the need for implementing legislation, then
the existence of a non-self-executing treaty would have placed the
memorandum in the second Youngstown category. 192 Given the
mixed signals Medellín sends regarding what makes a treaty non-selfexecuting, the draft rightly rejects an interpretation of Medellín as
establishing a presumption against self-execution. Indeed, the fact
that the Court purported to be applying rather than changing prior
law on self-execution 193 would appear to require rejection of such an
interpretation. The Court’s obvious intention to apply existing
standards means that, to the extent the holding of the case cannot be
squared with prior law, the holding should be limited to its facts (as
the draft suggests). 194
In light of the fact, recognized by the draft, that treaties rarely
address the question whether its provisions shall be directly

190. Id. at 509–14. Indeed, given the “inadequa[cy]” of the Court’s reliance on the text
of article 94(1), Professor Ramsey concludes that “the Medellín majority’s conclusion
principally depends on the assertion of an exclusive Security Council remedy through Article
94(2).” Ramsey, supra note 40, at 1665. As Professor Ramsey concedes, however, the latter
conclusion was itself “question[able].” Id. For a criticism of this part of the Court’s analysis,
see Vázquez, Judicial Enforcement, supra note 4, at 663–64.
191. Id. at 527. The Court’s reference was to the tripartite analysis elaborated by Justice
Jackson in his concurring opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579
(1952). The President’s actions fall into the third Youngstown category when he acts in
defiance of congressional will. The President’s actions fall in the second category—the “zone
of twilight”—when he acts in the face of congressional silence.
192. See Judicial Enforcement, supra note 4, at 657–58; Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Less
Than Zero?, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 563, 569 (2008).
193. See Judicial Enforcement, supra note 4, at 653–54 n.250.
194. See supra text accompanying note 5. Indeed, if Medellín is understood as suggested
above, supra text accompanying notes 129–35, then it applied the “justiciability” category of
non-self-execution and has no bearing on my argument here that there is a presumption that
treaties are self-executing in the “intent-based” sense.
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applicable as domestic law or directly enforceable by executive or
judicial officials, the courts will rarely find an answer to the selfexecution question in the treaty’s terms or in the intent of the parties
to the treaty. As Justice Breyer wrote in his dissenting opinion in
Medellín, to seek an answer to that question in the treaty itself is like
hunting for the snark. 195 If so, then it would appear that an intentbased test has to be coupled with a default rule of either selfexecution or non-self-execution. Given that (in the absence of a
declaration of non-self-execution) the default rule will rarely be
rebutted, a default rule of non-self-execution will mean that most
treaties will be non-self-executing. Such a result seems incompatible
with the text of the Supremacy Clause as well as with the many cases
in which the Supreme Court has either found treaties to be selfexecuting or enforced them without pausing to inquire about their
self-executing character. If a presumption is necessary, and the
presumption of non-self-execution is untenable, then the
presumption must be one in favor of self-execution.
The draft Restatement (Fourth) escapes this dilemma by insisting
that the issue does not turn on the treaty itself or on the joint intent
of the parties (as there will rarely be such an intent), but on the
unilateral intent of the U.S. treatymakers. 196 As discussed in Part III,
the intent of the U.S. treatymakers does control when it is
manifested in a declaration of non-self-execution. To the extent the
treatymakers may make their intent clear through a declaration, a
presumption in favor of self-execution should pose no difficulties
going forward. Indeed, if one believes that the issue should turn on
the intent of the U.S. treatymakers on the issue, a presumption of
self-execution is better than a presumption of non-self-execution
because, as the draft acknowledges, declarations of non-selfexecution stand on firmer constitutional footing than declarations of
self-execution. 197
As discussed above, in the absence of a declaration regarding selfexecution, reliance on the intent of the U.S. treatymakers presents
severe constitutional problems. Reliance on such intent is, moreover,
inconsistent with how the Courts in both Foster and Medellín

195.
196.
197.

See Medellín, 552 U.S. at 549 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
See supra Section III.A.
See supra text accompanying note 172.
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understood the issue before them. The Court in both cases
understood the issue as one of treaty interpretation and looked for
the meaning of the treaty as reflected (primarily) in the treaty’s text.
For the reasons discussed, if the issue turns on the meaning of the
treaty, and if most treaties do not address the issue, then the courts
need a presumption or default rule on which to base their selfexecution determinations, lest they rest their holdings on language
that was not intended to have any bearing on that question. From
the perspective of constitutional text and precedent, the superior
default rule is self-execution.
CONCLUSION
This Essay has proposed four improvements to the draft
Restatement (Fourth)’s provisions on self-execution of treaties. First,
the Restatement should recognize that the self-execution concept is
not a unitary one. The current draft implicitly recognizes at least two
distinct categories – the “constitutionality” category and the “intentbased” category – and it recognizes the distinctness of a third – the
“private right of action” category – albeit by insisting that it is not
really a self-execution issue. The Restatement should state explicitly
that the self-execution concept is not a unitary one, and it should
further distinguish the “justiciability” category from the “intentbased” category.
Second, the Restatement should qualify the claim that the selfexecution issue is essentially about judicial enforceability. Although
lack of judicial enforceability is one consequence of a conclusion that
a treaty is not self-executing (at least as the reporters have implicitly
defined the term), it is not the only consequence. With respect to
the constitutionality and intent-based categories, the conclusion that
a treaty is not self-executing also has important implications for
executive officials and private parties. More importantly, the claim
that the self-execution issue is essentially about judicial enforceability
distorts analysis of when a treaty is non-self-executing by sending
courts on a vain search for evidence that the treaty was intended to
be judicially enforceable.
Third, the Restatement should qualify the claim that the selfexecution issue turns on the intent of the U.S. treatymakers. Intent
matters at all only with respect to one of the categories of non-self1798

9.VAZQUEZ.FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

1747

5/6/2016 8:02 AM

Draft Restatement’s Treatment of Treaty Self-Execution

execution—the intent-based category. But the relevant intent is not
that of the U.S. treatymakers regarding judicial enforceability; it is
that of the parties to the treaty regarding whether the treaty “acts
upon the subject” or obligates the parties to “pass acts”
accomplishing the treaty’s aims. The intent of the U.S. treatymakers
regarding self-execution is conclusive when reflected in a declaration
of non-self-execution attached to the instruments of ratification, but
it is not conclusive in the absence of such a declaration.
Finally, the Restatement should qualify the claim that there is no
presumption for or against self-execution. Although there is no
presumption that a treaty is self-executing in the constitutionality or
justiciability senses, there is substantial support in the constitutional
text and in case law for a presumption that a treaty is self-executing
in the intent-based sense.
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